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This paper examines the lasting impact of the alignment of African countries during
the Cold War on their modern economic development. We find that the division of
the continent into two blocs (East/West) led to two clusters of development outcomes
that reflect the Cold War’s ideological divide. To determine alignment, we introduce a
non-cooperative game of social interactions where each country chooses one of the two
existing blocs based on its predetermined bilateral similarities with other members of
the bloc. We show the existence of a strong Nash equilibrium in our game and apply
the celebrated MaxCut method to identify such a partition. The alignment predicts UN
General Assembly voting patterns during the Cold War but not after. Our approach,
linking global political interdependence to distinct development paths in Africa, relies
on history to extract a micro-founded treatment assignment, while allowing for an
endogenous, process-oriented view of historical events.
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1 Introduction
Global politics and external influences feature prominently in theories of African economic
development. However, in spite of the well-documented interest in the legacy of colonization
in Africa (Alesina et al., 2011; Nunn, 2008), the impact of the post-colonial political landscape
of the Cold War has received undeservedly little attention (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou,
2020). Since the Cold War period coincided with several dramatic waves of independence
on the continent, it presented opportunities for African countries to adopt new development
policies and institutions, and to form new international alliances (Mazrui and Tidy, 1984;
Cooper, 2002). Given the fact that the superpowers, the US and the USSR, represented
different and possibly incompatible modes of economic organization, i.e. capitalism and
communism (Engerman, 2010; Gould-Davies, 2003), due to the path-dependent nature of
development policies, even temporary alignments could have differential economic conse-
quences outlasting the Cold War. On the other hand, conventional wisdom on the Cold War
points to superpower conduct that inflicted widespread political and economic turmoil in
Africa independently of alignment (Latham, 2010).
To address this important issue, we examine whether Cold War alignments indeed
affected the pattern of African economic development. Employing i) game-theoretical,
ii) computational, and iii) econometric methods, step by step, we uncover current devel-
opment clusters in Africa that reflect the ideological lines of the Cold War. For instance,
Western-aligned African countries have greater inequality (inequality cluster) coupled with
deeper financial penetration (market cluster), in line with two distinguishing features of the
prototypical economies of each Cold War bloc. This finding highlights at once the variety of
development paths and the reach of politics in disciplining the development trajectories of
African countries.
Identifying political alliances in the Cold War faces a common challenge of the assign-
ment rule of any historical treatment. Without a general history of the Cold War in Africa,
there are multiple, incomplete, and endogenous interpretations of alignment (Leffler and
Westad, 2010; Immerman and Goedde, 2013). Available information is obtained via the filter
of experts’ knowledge, which is itself inherently interlinked with post-treatment outcomes.
Historical events, especially large and protracted ones unfolding over time, such as the Cold
War, increase the complexity and interdependence of potential outcomes. African countries’
ties with the superpowers were fluid and represented diverse interests, leading to ambiguous
and changing bloc affiliation during the Cold War (Brzezinski, 1963; Legvold, 1970; Mazrui
and Wondji, 1993). Ignoring these features of the data introduces bias in standard estimation
methods or forces researchers to make strong assumptions about potential outcomes.
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Central to our approach to overcoming this challenge is a game-theoretic interpretation
of the Cold War. We model the formation of international alliances during the Cold War as
a game of social interactions between African countries, whose decisions on bloc affiliation
are solely based on their bilateral links between African countries and purposively ignore
the ideology of the Cold War and the superpowers as actors. We derive a unique alignment
that we call the focal partition to justify the use of an exclusion restriction to enable causal
analysis. Our partition merely splits the continent and does not label treatment status,
providing a framework for well-defined counterfactual analysis. To obtain our partition, we
show the existence of a unique strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) which is immune to deviations
by any country or groups of countries (Aumann, 1959; Bennett, 2000) and maximizes (size-
weighted) social welfare.
Since the identification of the focal partition is an NP-hard problem, we must address
this computational challenge. To compute the equilibrium alignment, we first show that
the alliance game can be recast as a MaxCut problem.1 After constructing the matrix
of pairwise payoffs from a set of predetermined characteristics,2 we employ a branch and
bound algorithm based on the MaxCut method to derive the unique focal partition of African
countries into two blocs (out of 247 possible configurations of Cold War alignment) (Goemans
and Williamson, 1995).3 We stress that our algorithm provides a global solution and hence
differs from commonly used local search algorithms such as k-means.
The focal partition follows a striking geographical pattern roughly cutting the continent
in two, North vs. South. Well-known cases of African countries’ purported alignments are
often grouped together, such as Liberia paired with South Africa and Algeria with Ethiopia.
We show that the focal partition significantly predicts countries’ voting patterns in the
UN General Assembly, where one can view a particular UN resolution vote as a realized
partition at one point in time. After labeling the blocs based on UN voting patterns, pseudo-
Western (pseudo-Eastern bloc) countries were more likely to vote with the US (USSR) at
UN resolutions between 1960-1991. The relationship is robust to restricting the sample
to relevant votes and different time periods and when we control for Cold War events.
We also demonstrate that the focal partition outperforms over 90% of randomly generated
partitions. Importantly, we compare the robustness of the estimated effects of the focal
partition with other possible equilibrium partitions of varying levels of stability, represented
by the minimum number of countries required to jointly switch their bloc affiliations to make
1The problem identifies a partition (the maximal cut) of a given weighted graph that gives the
maximal aggregate weight of common wedges between two disjoint subsets of vertices of the graph.
2These are contiguity, common colonizer and geodesic, genetic, linguistic and religious distances.
3While generating a lot of interest in the operations research literature (Palagi et al., 2012), the
MaxCut method was largely, and, in our view, unjustifiably ignored in economics.
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all of the deviating coalition better off. Only nine of the over 80 Nash equilibria are 2-stable.4
We show that the focal partition outperforms the other stable partitions. Our microfounded
notion of alignment is, thus, an effective aggregator of the complexity of Cold War history
in Africa.
From an econometric point of view, our theoretical approach reduces the ratio of po-
tential outcomes to each actual observation to two and, since the assignment rule assigns
treatment at the bloc level, our estimates will be less biased in the presence of social
interactions than if the treatment were assigned at the individual level (under some reg-
ularity assumptions). Additionally, the reliance of the menu of payoffs on pre-determined
characteristics eliminates dependence on ex-post information and individual countries do not
select into assignment on the basis of expectations about potential outcomes. Due to the lack
of experimental control over assignment, unconfoundedness of our treatment may still be a
concern and, therefore, we draw on propensity scores obtained from the UN voting partitions
to account for time-invariant, individual country-level observable and unobservable factors
that influence the probability of treatment assignment.
Having introduced our method, we now address the main question examined in this
paper: did Cold War political alliances produce development clusters in Africa? Following
Besley and Persson (2014), we use the term development clusters to refer to the correlation of
important characteristics of development and focus on ideologically-driven features of devel-
opment. Bates (2017) argues that politics profoundly affected African economic development
post-WWII. In a fascinating account of development strategies across the continent, Young
(1982) persuasively argues that ideology was not simply rhetoric and affected the policy
choices of African countries in important ways. In addition, Gorman (1984) documents that
ideology strengthened ties among African countries, reinforcing these policy choices.
Our analysis is driven by three distinct hypotheses. First, the level of economic develop-
ment did not vary widely on the continent on the eve of the independence movements (Young,
1982) and both ideologies shared the view that economic growth was a central objective
(Engerman, 2004). In the spirit of the famous bet between Nkrumah and Houphouët-Boigny
on which country’s development path would lead to higher levels of economic output per
capita, we ask whether the focal partition gives rise to a winners-and-losers cluster in terms
of development levels.5 Controlling for the initial level of development, we regress income
per capita, averaged over 1990−2016, on the focal partition and find that we are unable to
statistically distinguish between the levels of development in the two blocs. Therefore, the
pseudo-Western bloc affiliation did not yield higher incomes in Africa.
4I.e., at least three countries need to jointly switch to make a deviation worth it for all deviators.
5We realize “winners and losers” may mischaracterize the resolution of the Cold War.
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Second, we scrutinize whether the focal partition produces development clusters that
reflect the ideological differences of the superpowers’ development strategies. Following
Bergson (1984), we view the level of economic inequality (inequality cluster) and financial
penetration (market cluster) as two necessary distinguishing features of the prototypical
economies associated with each Cold War bloc. The separation of production and income
under socialism makes equality feasible, whereas the accumulation of financial assets drives
inequality in a market economy. We document that the pseudo-Western-bloc countries
have greater inequality coupled with deeper financial penetration, a result in line with the
ideologically-driven pathways of the superpowers.
Finally, we inquire about the emergence of other clusters related to investments in human
capital, physical capital and inclusive institutions. For these intermediary outcomes, ideo-
logical differences do not provide us with strong priors on the correspondence of development
outcomes with alignment. The different investment strategies encouraged by superpowers,
however, should have produced systematic differences given that the two sides clashed over
the methods of reaching greater production (Engerman, 2004). We demonstrate that pseudo-
Western-bloc countries have greater human capital, measured by the literacy rate and gender
parity in education, coupled with greater education expenditure share in the government
budget, and do better on democracy score. In contrast, they have lower infrastructure
levels, proxied by electrification.
For robustness, we account for any possible individual differences in a country’s likelihood
to be aligned with the US/USSR. The particular nature of our assignment rule allows for a
powerful construction of propensity score using UN voting alignment that can account for
both observable and unobservable time-invariant factors that influence a country’s likelihood
of being treated. No matter if we match on propensity score, weight using propensity score
or simply control for it in our regressions, our results are robust. As with any one-off
experimental or observational study with a small sample size, the treatment effect could be
biased by happenstance correlations. We check the stability of our estimate to controlling for
each pre-determined characteristic of our payoff matrix and the main results hold. Finally,
since we assign treatment at the bloc level with only two treatment clusters, we perform
randomization inference to obtain exact p-values for each development outcome.6 For most
outcomes, the focal partition outperforms over 90% of random partitions.
Our research contributes to the growing literature on the relevance of history for present
outcomes (Nunn, 2009, 2014; O’Rourke, 1994). Among the few studies on historical political
alignment, Akee et al. (2015) find that the political party of the US president affected the type
6The conventional adjustment to standard errors to allow for intracluster correlations is not
feasible. MacKinnon and Webb (2019) show that randomization inference is a valid alternative.
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of constitution adopted by American Indian Nations with long-run effects on development.
Within the Cold War context, previous research documents the effect of political alliances
on trade and conflict (Gokmen, 2017, 2018), as well as the impact of political influence
on increased imports from the US (Berger et al., 2013). We instead provide evidence that
political alliances shape the patterns of long-run development. We differ from the previous
literature in our approach to using history to construct a historical treatment variable.
From a theoretical viewpoint, this paper is part of the literature on formation of groups,
coalitions, and alliances. Specifically, our framework belongs to the class of hedonic games
(Banerjee et al., 2001; Bogomolnaia and Jackson, 2002), where players’ payoffs depend solely
on the group they belong to. In our setting, we apply the landscape theory (Axelrod and
Bennett, 1993; Bennett, 2000), where each player evaluates every potential partner and
ranks two possible blocs by the sum of its individual evaluations of group members. The
dependence of individuals’ utility on the actions and identity of other players has been
recognized in studies of social interactions and networks as dyadic externalities from player’s
peers.7 In these settings, gains from cooperation increase as the distances among players in
the coalition decrease (Le Breton and Weber, 1995).8
Lastly, we add to the literature on African development (Easterly and Levine, 1997;
Alesina et al., 2003; Nunn, 2008; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013). While the previous
literature focused on the role of colonization or pre-colonial ethnic institutions in African
development (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Alesina et al., 2011; Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007; Nunn,
2008; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013, 2020), the influence of the post-colonial political
landscape has received little attention. In their review, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou
(2020) call for more research on post-independence politics and economic trajectories. In
response to this challenge, we add to the literature by studying how international political
alliances during the Cold War shaped the development trajectories of African nations. To
our knowledge, we are the first to systematically study the effect of the Cold War on long-run
development in Africa.
7The strategic choice of a side in an international conflict is part of an extensive literature where
players’ strategies are represented as the choice of one among two existing alternatives. A celebrated
example of the analysis of the social influence channels in the dichotomic setting is the threshold
model of collective action (Schelling, 1978) (see also Granovetter (1978)), where participation of an
individual in an action depends on the fraction of the population engaged in the action (Durlauf
and Ioannides, 2010; Le Breton and Weber, 2011).
8Desmet et al. (2011) consider a nation formation game with pairwise hedonic heterogeneity
based on the genetic distances between nations. In international relations, Bueno de Mesquita
(1975, 1981) calculates the proximity between pairs of nations based on their defense alliances to
evaluate war proneness. Other rational-choice theories of alliance formation differ from landscape
theory, e.g., Altfeld and De Mesquita (1979).
5
The next section discusses our approach. Section 3 briefly describes the history of the
Cold War in Africa and presents several case studies. Section 4 presents the model and the
result on the existence of a SNE. Section 5 presents the focal partition. Section 6 performs an
econometric validation exercise. Our main results on development outcomes are in Section 7.
Section 8 concludes.
2 Our Approach
In this section, we provide a more detailed account of our approach and its advantages. We
first discuss why the features of the data present difficulties for standard estimation methods.
Note that we do not suggest that these features preclude causal analysis. Historians develop
causal claims under imperfect information.9 A researcher wading through the contingencies
and interconnectedness of historical processes typically encounters two types of problems: i)
an indeterminate assignment rule and ii) interdependence.
First, the ambiguity and multiplicity of treatment presents the researcher with more
than two potential outcomes for each observation. Potential outcomes increase when there
are incomplete assignment of a relevant treatment, equally meaningful treatment variants or
multiple plausible counterfactual scenarios. In this case, the Stable Unit Treatment Value As-
sumption (SUTVA), implicit in standard treatment effect analysis, is violated (VanderWeele
and Hernán, 2013). One solution to this problem is to ignore multiplicity and commit to a
single version of the treatment.10 We do not pursue this route for three reasons. First, with
incomplete information on assignment, one needs to assume that the treatment is measured
with error, which brings about the challenge of identifying valid instruments.11 Second, fixing
one version runs the risk of drawing conclusions from an arbitrary interpretation of Cold War
assignment (even when there is complete information on assignment). Third, the multiplicity
of historical paths muddies what absence of treatment means for a particular country and,
without an explicit approach to counterfactual assignment, using weighted outcomes of the
control group to construct a counterfactual for a particular country becomes suspect (Fearon,
1991; Hernán, 2016).
Second, treatment assignment needs to consider the agency of African countries in con-
fronting the political problem of alignment during the Cold War. Ignoring these important
9See Landes (1994) for a discussion of these issues.
10One expert attempt to partition Africa into Cold War blocs is based on arms trade with the
superpowers (Fearon and Hansen, 2018), whose partition is uncorrelated with ours.
11For example, in order to use the arms trade as in Fearon and Hansen (2018) to determine
assignment, one would need to find a variable that is correlated with the arms trade but only
affects development outcomes through bloc affiliation.
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social interactions would constitute another violation of SUTVA. The continent was looking
inward toward forging African unity and nation building vis-à-vis the superpowers’ desire to
influence. As the Pan-Africanist George Padmore writes, “[t]here is a growing feeling among
the politically conscious Africans throughout the continent that their destiny is one, that
what happens in one part of Africa to Africans must affect Africans living in other parts
(Padmore, 1956, p. 22).” Due to colonial legacies, newly independent African countries
were initially wary of being influenced by superpowers even though both the US and the
USSR were formally in favor of decolonization and independence (Leffler and Westad, 2010).
Clearly, the superpowers’ economic and military assistance and occasional openly hostile
military interventions also influenced the formation of alliances. In fact, we have identified
800 instances of interventions by either the US or the USSR during the Cold War.12 However,
African countries’ first and enduring instinct was to look toward each other as examples
and collaborators to navigate the Cold War environment.13 This observation reinforces the
argument that the assignment rule should take into account the push for African unity and
the freedom of individual countries to choose the alliance of their choice.
We address these issues drawing on theory, which allows us to carry out a causal
analysis based on a unique alignment, the focal partition. To establish such a partition that
incorporates collective and individual aspirations, and to bridge the gap between efficiency
and stability, we utilize the notion of strong Nash equilibrium –SNE– that is immune to any
deviations by any country or groups of countries (Aumann, 1959; Bennett, 2000). While this
refinement, in general, does not generate a unique assignment rule, it does yield a unique
focal partition in our setting. In addition, the focal partition has an attractive feature from
a social welfare point of view as it maximizes the weighted sum of the countries’ payoffs with
weights being sizes of countries. This feature allows us to unequivocally link predetermined
characteristics of African countries with a stable equilibrium partition of the continent,
avoiding an ambiguous aggregation of the data at hand and permitting counterfactual
analysis with only two potential outcomes.
Theoretical properties of the focal partition provide further justification for our econo-
metric assumptions. The focal partition, besides being immune to group deviations of any
size, possesses robust empirical properties for equilibrium selection (Ui, 2001). To more
fully appreciate this point, the game yields over 80 Nash equilibria, far too many potential
12Over a third of African countries experienced military interventions by the superpowers
(Schmidt, 2013).
13There are several examples of attempted cooperation among African countries, such as Senegal
and Soudan forming the Federation of Mali; Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Benin joining
together in a loose organization; Ghana and Guinea establishing a union, as well as the cooperation
of Brazzaville countries (Berg, 1960).
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outcomes to empirically consider. That is, the payoff structure given by the predetermined
characteristics is consistent with over 80 distinct alignments had our solution been Nash
equilibrium, where no individual country has incentives to deviate from a given partition.
Since individual shocks in the Cold War environment could have temporarily altered a
country’s preferences, it is unlikely that an assignment rule based on mere Nash equilibria
would have remained intact. In contrast, it is unlikely that even a coordinated superpower
intervention or a widespread economic shock would have disrupted the focal partition.
Because we only use general historical knowledge to infer Cold War alignment for
African countries, we need to validate our theory and label treatment status using ex-interim
information. The unique solution merely indicates how the continent would split itself into
two groups without attributing any affiliation with the superpowers. Each bloc has the
same ex-ante probability of being assigned treatment, providing theoretical grounds for the
assumption that treatment assignment is independent of potential outcomes of an individual
country. The sign of the coefficient on the focal partition in UN voting regressions enables
us to assign a label to the alignment, ensuring that we employ a probabilistic assignment
rule as well as assign treatment at the bloc level given the social interactions. Since these
votes are not binding, and hence, impose little direct cost, UN voting patterns are useful in
revealing the tacit alignment. At the same time, the votes are highly politicized, and thus,
the focal partition should have predictive power if the tacit alignment mattered. Moreover,
by excluding the focal partition, we can estimate country fixed effects that summarize the
correlations between UN voting alignment and time-invariant observable and unobservable
factors at the country level influencing the probability of treatment assignment, enabling us
a propensity score analysis of the effect of the focal partition on development outcomes.
To summarize, our approach has several attractive features. First, given the multitude of
pairs of potential outcomes for each actual observation, each representing different versions
of the treatment, our theoretical approach employs an exclusion restriction to reduce the
number of potential outcomes that we need to consider. Specifically, the game yields
a structural interpretation of this global historical event of creating a “tacit pattern of
alignment among states” that reflects the history of the Cold War in Africa. Second, the
reliance of the menu of payoffs on pre-determined characteristics eliminates dependence
on ex-post information and makes plausible the assumption that the assignment rule is
independent of potential outcomes since individual countries do not select into assignment
on the basis of expectations about potential outcomes. Finally, the assignment rule accounts
for social interactions by assigning treatment at the bloc level.
Our approach differs from the previous literature that often employs a narrow concept
of history (typically for identification purposes), where historical events are equated with a
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shock or a quasi-experimental intervention. This use of history offers a stark contrast to a
more complex, process-oriented view of history as a highly differentiated product that resists
aggregation. Thus, there is a dilemma: whether to use a unique mapping from history onto
economic shocks or to allow for multiple interpretations relaxing the requirement to describe
the impact of a historical event as an average tendency toward a particular outcome. This
paper presents a middle ground: we allow history to be dynamic and endogenous with
multiple potential paths, while we extract a quantifiable and identifiable causal factor to
understand the impact of history on outcomes today. The advantage of our approach is that
we do not need to assume a unique mapping and instead offer a microfounded understanding
of history to support our causal claims. This alternative method is generalizable to other
settings and is especially attractive in the absence of consensus among historians.
3 Cold War in Africa
Schmidt (2013) writes, “Of all the Cold War battlegrounds, Africa is the least well known.”14
As such, there is no sufficient general history of the Cold War in Africa that can guide and
inform our assignment rule and we face imperfect verification of our model-based partitioning.
That said, several important themes and some consensus about political alliances in certain
cases emerge from the literature.
Historians situate the Cold War events in the context of other major periods of external
interest in Africa, such as the slave trade or colonialism. What sets the Cold War apart is the
post-WWII independence movements, together with the growing importance of international
alliances and the role of ideology in these alliances. The number of alignment groups was
exogenously imposed by the superpowers. The Western bloc, USA and Western Europe,
opposed communism and encouraged the establishment of free markets open to globalization.
The Eastern bloc, the USSR, supported regimes in favor of Soviet-style development and,
to some extent, were anti-colonialist.15 The superpowers viewed competition for Africa
as a zero-sum game and any neutral status of a particular African country as temporary
(Allison et al., 1989). Although the colonial legacy left many leaders wary of alliances
14In the 2010 three volume Cambridge History of the Cold War, there are only two chapters
that mention Africa specifically (Leffler and Westad, 2010) –the first on the Cold War in the Third
World and the second on the Cold War in Southern Africa. The Oxford Handbook of the Cold
War has a single chapter on Africa (Immerman and Goedde, 2013).
15In principle, one can also look at roles played by China and Cuba. The former clashed with the
Soviet Union on some occasions, e.g., Angola, but was similarly the proponent of anti-imperialist
and pro-socialist development. Cuba has also supported the pro-socialist development, being a
Soviet surrogate in eyes of the US. Therefore, we restrict attention to two groups only.
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with the superpowers, the waves of independence and decolonization left a void of political
and economic influence that the superpowers were eager to fill. Such strategic alliances
implied development and military assistance as well as economic and political opportunities
for African leaders (Latham, 2010). Moreover, assistance was often given with little account-
ability provided that there was ideological alignment. As we indicated above, over a third of
African countries experienced foreign military interventions by the superpowers. Moreover,
various forms of economic, military and technical assistance were quite common all across
the continent throughout the Cold War period (Schmidt, 2013).
3.1 Examples
Ghana. We start off with an example of the fluidity of alignments and the importance
of leadership for political alignment. A leader’s preferences might drive the observable
alliances and these observable alliances may deviate from the underlying tacit alignment
among African countries. Thus, when the leader changes, a different set of political alliances
could emerge.
Ghana gained independence from the UK in 1957. Both the USSR and the US courted
the first president of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, who received his education in both countries.
For example, the US Vice-President Richard Nixon attended the independence celebrations
in Ghana, while Nkrumah was awarded Lenin Peace Prize in 1962. Yet, Nkrumah had an
affinity for the USSR. Nkrumah, with Soviet assistance, set upon implementing socialist
policies and invited Soviet specialists to demonstrate agriculture techniques adapted to
Ghana (Iandolo, 2012). In 1966, a US-supported military coup overthrew Nkrumah while
he was touring Vietnam and China. The new government drastically changed the mode of
development by inviting the IMF/World Bank to manage the economy and by opening to
western markets, a policy that British had been advocating since independence. Thereafter,
under the Busia government, western ties were affirmed (Gebe, 2008).
Ghana’s alliance was therefore subject to the preferences of their leader. Both develop-
ment paths were clearly open to the young nation and both superpowers clearly aimed to
influence the direction Ghana took.
Guinea and Kenya. We now turn to two case studies on how the Cold War influenced the
development patterns and policies under Soviet and American modes of development.
Guinea is an example of the Eastern mode of development. It gained independence from
France in 1958. The USSR quickly recognized its government. The first president, Ahmed
Sékou Touré, was a nationalist and wanted to implement Marxist policies. By 1959, Guinea
signed bilateral trade agreements with five Eastern Bloc countries. The USSR delegation
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was invited to visit, draw up objectives, and actually base development policy on socialist
principles of: 1) modern agriculture in both collective and state farms, 2) investment in
industry and infrastructure, 3) nationalization and restriction of foreign capital. Touré’s
presidency survived until 1984, and along the way, he outlawed other parties and was the
only candidate for several elections.16
In contrast, Kenya, an example of Western mode, gained independence in 1963 from
the UK. US immediately recognized it, and shortly after, established diplomatic relations
and a military base in Mombasa. USAID has conducted education programs, including
scholarships to Kenyan students to study in the US. US development programs emphasized
technology transfer, infrastructure, democracy, market reforms, and health care. There was
rapid growth in the number of firms and firm size in the post-independence period. This
system provided a means by which individuals could accumulate capital and wealth, but
ultimately led to an increase in total production and production per head. Nevertheless,
Kenya experiences a high level of income inequality with a high poverty rate, where 65% of
the population lives on less than $2/day.17
These two cases clearly demonstrate the influence of the Cold War on the modes of
economic development.
4 The Model
Our theoretical setting is built on two main assumptions. One is the two-bloc structure where
all countries are partitioned into two blocs, which will be called E (for pseudo-Eastern) and
W (for pseudo-Western). The second premise of our model is that a country makes a bloc
choice based on the identity of and the bilateral relationships with other members of the
bloc. This approach was pioneered by the “landscape theory” (Axelrod and Bennett, 1993),
which bases its predictions on historical, political, and other types of bilateral links between
every pair of countries.
Formally, we consider a bloc-formation game Γ where players (African states), denoted
by N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, choose between two blocs, E and W . Countries’ decisions are based
on their proximity to other members of the bloc. That is, for every two countries i and j,
the level of their propensity to be together is denoted by pij = pji with pii = 0 for all i ∈ N .
The propensity pij is assumed to be the reverse of alienation between two countries, dij ≥ 0,
i.e. pij = −dij, which may capture historical, ethnic, and linguistic differences between i
16Department of State (1959); New York Times (1964); World Bank (1984); WTO (2011).
17Hetherington (1993); Department of State (2018); Omolo et al. (2016); USAID (2019); The
Guardian (2013).
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and j.18 As noted by Bennett (2000), “measuring size and actors’ propensities is a key
part of applying landscape theory to real situations.[...]Landscape theory does not have as
part of it a theory of propensity, but such a theory (which is domain specific) is crucial to
landscape’s theory and application and testing”. In their application of landscape theory
to the examination of European alliances, Axis and Allies, prior to the Second World War,
Axelrod and Bennett (1993) construct a propensity matrix P by aggregating (with equal
weights) indicators spanning both positive and negative values for every pair of countries.19
Hence, the propensity values can be either positive or negative –unlike in our model.20
Additional parameter of relevance is the size si of country i. It is reasonable to assume that
the relationship with a larger country is more important than having a proper relationship
with a smaller one. We assume that the payoff of a country that belongs to bloc E would be
represented by the size-weighted sum of propensities of working together with other members










In this game, countries are allowed to change their bloc affiliation. In the Nash setting,
only individual countries can switch to another bloc. A partition of all countries in two blocs
is Nash stable (or constitutes a Nash equilibrium) if there are no countries for which the
individual switch would be beneficial.
Definition 1: A partition of all countries in two blocs E and W is a Nash equilibrium if
there is no i ∈ E such that







18It implies that all propensities are negative, meaning that countries assign negative values to
their partnerships.
19They use the following five indicators: the presence of ethnic conflict, the existence of a border
disagreement, and the recent history of wars between the two, the similarity of the religions of their
populations, and the similarity of the types of governments.
20Out of the 272 non-diagonal entries of the 17 × 17 matrix computed by Axelrod and Bennett
(1993), 98 of them are negative and 46 are positive. The rest are zeroes, and many of the non-zero
entries are very close to 0. We wish to take this opportunity to thank Robert Axelrod for sharing
with us their propensity matrix.
12
and there is no i ∈ W such that







To account for possible group bloc-switching, we consider a stronger concept of strong
Nash equilibrium that allows for any group deviations rather than only individual ones
(Aumann, 1959). In particular, we permit bloc-swapping where a group of countries S in E
wishes to move to W , while another group T in W would move in the opposite direction.
Obviously, either S or T could be empty, and the one-sided movement is also feasible.
Definition 2: A partition of all countries in two blocs E and W is a strong Nash equilibrium
(SNE) if there are no sets S ⊂ E and T ⊂ W (one of which could be empty) such that







for every i in S and







for every i in T .
Then, we have the following proposition:
Proposition: Γ admits a SNE.
A complete proof of this proposition is relegated to Online Appendix C. The proof utilizes
the notion of a potential function formalized by Monderer and Shapley (1996) and its
generalization to strong potential (Holzman and Law-Yone, 1997), which encompasses the
incentive of individuals or groups of players to change their bloc affiliation in one single
function. Monderer and Shapley (1996) distinguish between three types of potential games:
exact potential or, simply, potential games where the difference in individual payoffs for
each player from changing her strategy is equal to the difference in values for the potential
function; weighted potential games, for which the difference in individual payoffs for each
deviating player, is equal to the weighted difference in values for the potential function with
respect to some vector of positive weights; and ordinal potential games, where only the signs
of the differences have to be the same. Obviously, the set of exact potential games is a
subset of weighted potential games, which, in turn, is a subset of ordinal potential games.
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Naturally, a maximum of an ordinal potential, and thus, of exact and weighted potential
games, yields a pure strategies Nash equilibrium. Similarly, a maximum of strong potential
function yields a strong Nash equilibrium of the corresponding game.
To prove our proposition, we show that Γ is a weighted strong potential game, whose
weighted potential is given by the sum of players’ payoffs:







We show that for pair of deviating sets S ⊂ E and T ⊂ W the following equalities hold:
Ui(W ∪ S \ T )− Ui(E) = si(P (E ∪ T \ S,W ∪ S \ T )
for all i ∈ E and
Ui(E ∪ T \ S)− Ui(W ) = si(P (E ∪ T \ S,W ∪ S \ T )
for all i ∈ W . That is, the game Γ is a weighted potential game where the weights are given
by the size parameters si.
21 The last observation allows us to define the game Γ̂ where the
utilities of individuals are given by
Ûi(E) = siUi(E) =
∑
j∈E
sisjpij for every i ∈ E,
and
Ûi(W ) = siUi(W ) =
∑
j∈W
sisjpij for every i ∈ W.
Note that the difference between payoffs in the two games is that countries’ payoffs in the
game Γ̂ are weighted by their own size. The games are strategically equivalent, and, thus,
possess the same sets of equilibria. However, while Γ is a weighted strong potential game, Γ̂
is an exact strong potential one, whose exact potential P̂ is given by:













In our empirical part of examination, we focus on strong equilibria of both games
and show that our data yields a unique strong potential maximizer that yields the focal
21It worth mentioning that for weighted potential games, the set of of potential maximizers does
not depend on a particular choice of a weighted potential. See Monderer and Shapley (1996),
footnote 13.
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partition for Γ̂. Monderer and Shapley (1996) point out that the selection of exact potential
maximizers from the equilibrium, which represents an equilibrium refinement, has garnered
strong empirical and theoretical support. The equilibrium selection predicted by maximizers
of the potential is the one that is supported by the experimental results of Van Huyck et
al. (1990) (see also Crawford (1991)). Ui (2001) shows that Nash equilibria that maximize
potential functions are generically robust in the sense of Kajii and Morris (1997). Robustness
of potential maximizers was further explored by Carbonell-Nicolau and McLean (2014) who
demonstrate that the set of maximizers of an upper semicontinuous potential contains a
strategically stable (in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986)) set of pure-strategy Nash
equilibria. Hofbauer and Sorger (2002) show that the potential maximizer is the unique
profile which is absorbing and globally accessible in the dynamic model of Matsui and
Matsuyama (1995).
Somewhat surprisingly, since pij = −dij where dij ≥ 0 for all i, j with i 6= j, the
determination of the exact potential maximizer of Γ̂ is equivalent to a famous problem in
combinatorial optimization known as the MaxCut problem. The latter can be described
simply as follows. Let an undirected graph G with a set of vertices N be given. Assume
also, that there are nonnegative weights wij for all edges (i, j) of the graph, where wij = wji
for every pair of vertices i and j. The MaxCut problem is that of finding the subset of
vertices S that maximize the weight of the edges in the cut (S,N\S), that is the weight of
the edges with one endpoint in S and the other in N\S. In other words, the MaxCut is the

























































Since the left-hand side of this equality is independent of a choice of set S, we observe








j∈N\S sisjdij with respect to (S,N\S)




j∈N\S sisjdij with respect to (S,N\S).
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5 The Partition
After having demonstrated the existence of a SNE for a class of coalition formation games,
we now operationalize the theory and turn to the computational aspects attached to the
determination of these Nash equilibria and the algorithms to perform this task. To that
end, we first need to construct a matrix of bilateral propensities to cooperate, whose typical
element is (pij)1≤i,j≤n, which we have assumed to be opposite to the average bilateral societal
“distance” as measured across various dimensions.
In the baseline analysis of propensity to cooperate, we employ the following dimensions
of societal distance: contiguity, common colonizer,22 bilateral geodesic distance, genetic
distance, linguistic distance, and religious distance between countries. Following Axelrod
and Bennett (1993), we weight the average distances by the national material capabilities
of the two countries to adjust for varying degrees of size, power and influence countries
have.23 This addresses the issue that distance with a small country is not as important for
determining alignments as an equivalent distance with a large country. Finally, the rescaled
“distance” between any two countries is defined as follows:24
Distanceij = MaterialCapabilitiesi ∗MaterialCapabilitiesj ∗mean((1− Contiguityij)+
(1− CommonColonizerij) +GeodesicDistanceij +GeneticDistanceij+
LinguisticDistanceij +ReligiousDistanceij)
In order to find a focal partition in the game with 247 different configurations, we make
use of the fact that our game admits a potential. Since the maximization of the potential is,
as we show above, equivalent to the well documented combinatorial optimization problem
known as Max-Cut, we are able to take advantage of recent advances in computer science that
allow us to search over these combinations in a relatively efficient manner.25 Specifically,
we employ a branch and bound algorithm, which imposes a set of inequality constraints.
22While constructing the distance index, we employ (1-contiguity) and (1-common colonizer) to
render these variables in distance terms.
23National Material Capabilities Index combines components of demographic, industrial and
military power. See Online Appendix A for more details on the data sources.
24As alluded to in the preceding section, we multiply each country’s weighted sum of distances
by the “size” of the country to obtain the rescaled propensity matrix. Given the distances dij
calculated here, we could switch to propensities to cooperate by denoting pij = d − dij , where d
is a constant satisfying d ≤ max
i,j
. Depending on the values of d, some (but not all) entries of the
propensity matrix may become positive.
25The fact that the entries of the propensity matrix are negative allows us to exploit the
connection to the MaxCut problem. If some of the entries are positive, then the MaxCut problem
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This algorithm embeds the discrete choice of deciding which bloc to join into a semi-definite
program with a continuous choice giving an upper bound on the maximum potential. The
lower bound is obtained using an approximation algorithm with random cuts in the same
vein as the Goemans-Williamson algorithm. These bounds are then used to rule out different
subproblems (branches), e.g., eliminating branches with upper bounds that are lower than
the incumbent lower bound. The conclusion of this process provides an exact solution for
the maximal potential, which yields the focal partition.
To expand our analysis, we also search for other equilibria, which, naturally, generate
a lower size-weighted aggregate payoff than the focal partition. To do so, we employ a
modification of the Goemans-Williamson approximation algorithm that includes local search
algorithm. While this technique yields, according to Goemans and Williamson (1995), the
total payoff of at least 0.87 of the global optimum in expectation, there is no guarantee that
the NE that we subsequently identify are in the neighborhood of the optimum. For each
of these equilibria, we then check the degree of its stability. For any positive integer k, a
partition of the entire set into two blocs is k-stable, if there is no group of k countries that
can improve their payoff by changing their bloc affiliation. Formally,
Definition 3: A NE is k-stable if there is no group of k countries that can benefit by
changing their bloc affiliations.
Note that any k-stable NE is also k−1-stable, and therefore, the set of k-stable equilibria
is shrinking in k. After running our algorithm 10,000 times (each time, we follow Goemans-
Williamson algorithm and then iterate to a Nash Equilibrium), we uncovered 86 Nash
Equilibria,26 of which only nine are 2-stable (see Table 1). Of these nine, only two are
4-, 5-, or 6- or 7-stable: the focal partition and another NE. Our focal partition is the
unique one that is 8- (or any number larger than 8) stable! We view these results as rather
remarkable in the Cold War context. Given all the opportunities for group deviation, the
has negative entries (see theorem 3.2.1 of Goemans and Williamson (1995) for a generalization of
their result to arbitrary weights). Likely, another program/algorithm might need to be used.
26Note that this number is substantially larger than in the Axis and Allies the pre-WWII game
examined by Axelrod and Bennett (1993), who found only two Nash equilibria (local minimizers).
We suspect that this discrepancy is due to the fact that in their game a significant number of
entries of the propensity matrix are either positive or equal to 0. As Bennett (2000) puts it: “The
domains examined earlier shared the common feature that only a small number of optima were
found suggesting a relatively smooth landscape. This may be partly a result of how propensity is
constructed and of how the factors that contribute to propensity are clustered in the real world.”In
fact, Axelrod and Bennett (1993) also consider a variant of their landscape game where all entries
of the propensity matrix are equal to -1 and notice that the new game, similarly to ours, generates
a large number of local minimizers, namely, 209.
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focus on stability is warranted. The fact that there are only a few relatively stable NE
further justifies our emphasis on focusing on the SNE, which is presented in Table 2.
Table 1 Stability of Nash Equilibria
1-stable 2-stable 3-stable 4-stable 7-stable 8-stable SNE
Number of Nash Equilibria 86 9 4 2 . . . 2 1 . . . 1
Notes: This set of NE is potentially not exhaustive. We obtain this set from running our algorithm (details are in the
appendix) 10,000 times. The concept of stability, k -stable, refers to a feature of the NE that requires that there is no coalition
of size less than or equal to k such that if all the members deviated each of the members would be better off. SNE stands for
strong Nash equilibrium.
The above discussion on stability properties of equilibria also gives credence to focusing
on the predictive power of the focal partition in the face of dynamic strategic considerations
that would have altered the immediate interest to align with a particular bloc for one or
more countries.
Table 2 Focal Partition (baseline distances)
Pseudo-Western Bloc: Angola, Botswana, Burundi, Congo, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia,
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Somalia,
South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Pseudo-Eastern Bloc: Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Re-
public, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guinea,
Gambia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger,
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia
How does this focal partition compare to what we know about the Cold War period
in Africa? To proceed, let us call the bloc that is more likely to align with the US as the
Pseudo-Western Bloc (and the opposite Pseudo-Eastern Bloc). Table 2 and Figure 1 inform
us about the distribution of countries across the African continent. We first observe that
some countries that one would deem as obviously Western aligned based on historical records
and relationships are in the Pseudo-Western Bloc, such as Botswana, DRC, Kenya, Liberia,
Rwanda, and South Africa. At the same time, some historically Eastern-aligned countries
are in the Pseudo-Eastern Bloc, such as Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Guinea,
Libya, Mali, and Morocco. Third, there are some interesting cases, such as Guinea-Bissau
and Guinea splitting into two different blocs, or the cases of Ghana and Cote D’Ivoire being
in the opposite of their predicted blocs (due to their leaders’ preferences perhaps, such as the
President Nkrumah of Ghana). Finally, there are some outliers that do not fit the historical
account, such as Angola, Congo, Gambia, Mozambique. Interestingly, most of these countries
had civil conflicts that involved both sides (arguably proxy wars).
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Figure 1 Focal Partition (baseline distances)
This partition is useful in contributing to our understanding of unstable coalitions
that emerged during the Cold War, such as the Monrovia and Casablanca groups. These
groups were formed in 1961 but were quickly disbanded upon the establishment of the
Organization of African Unity in 1963. The leaders of the Monrovia group had the vision
of the newly independent African states retaining their autonomy and self-governing, while
strengthening their own bureaucracies, militaries and economies. Whereas the Casablanca
group was a strong proponent of Pan-Africanism with deep African integration and even
African political unification or federation with a supranational pan-African authority. These
two blocs represented two different visions of the Organization of African Unity but failed
to maintain coordinated action to manifest their vision. While the Casablanca group was
clearly aligned with the Eastern bloc, the Monrovia Group had ties with the Western Bloc.
We first point out that 6 of the 7 Casablanca countries are in the pseudo-Eastern Bloc
(with the exception of Ghana), while the Monrovia group is scattered among both blocs
(See Table 2 and Panel B of Table 3). However, the pseudo blocs of the focal partition are
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Table 3 Focal Partition (baseline distances) Restricted to the 27 Countries in Casablanca
and Monrovia Groups
Panel A: Predicted Blocs
Predicted Bloc 1: Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African
Republic, Chad, Congo, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Guinea, Libya,
Mali, Madagascar, Morocco, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal,
Togo, Tunisia
Predicted Bloc 2: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana,
Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia
Panel B: Realized Monrovia and Casablanca Groups
Monrovia: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Repub-
lic, Chad, Congo, Ivory Coast, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritania,
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, Tunisia
Casablanca: Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Mali, Morocco
formed using the full matrix of pairwise distances. Therefore, we rerun the alignment game
for the 27 countries that were members of either group. The potential maximizer, given
in Panel A of Table 3, represents the realized partition poorly, suggesting either that the
realized partition was unstable given the bilateral relationships among the 27 countries or
that the restriction to the 27 countries does not take into account the fact that the countries
in Casablanca or Monrovia undertook their alignment decisions with the whole continent in
mind. Either way, this result clearly demonstrates that the theory is falsifiable.
6 UN Voting Patterns During the Cold War Among
African Countries
6.1 Data
UN roll-call votes illustrate well the nature of political alliances in the Cold War environment.
In general, the US and the USSR did not align in UN voting, meaning that voting with the
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US or USSR was a signal of alignment in one of the two blocs.27 To capture political
alignment patterns at the international level during the Cold War, we employ a dataset of
roll-call votes in the United Nations General Assembly between 1946-2017 (Voeten, 2013).28
This dataset provides us with information on each country’s vote for a given resolution. A
vote can take values of 1 (Yes), 2 (Abstain), or 3 (No) if a country voted on a particular
resolution. These votes aggregate diverse interests across varied themes and voting similarity
reveals compatible preferences or views (Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2006). Each vote is a realized
partition, but one with little to no commitment to realized alignment. 11.3% of the votes
cast were with the US. Of those not voting with the US, 68.2% vote with the USSR and
20.4% vote with neither.
To construct our dependent variable, we compare how each country voted relative to
the US. Our main dependent variable then takes a value of one when a country votes in the
same way as the US, and zero otherwise.29 We define
voteUSAit = 1[voteit = voteUSAt]
where voteit captures country i’s vote on resolution t and 1[·] is an indicator function.
There were 4485 roll call votes over the entire period (1946-2017). There were 318
votes in the 50s, 407 in the 60s, 729 in the 70s and 1258 in the 80s. We restrict attention
to votes between 1960-1991 for baseline specifications since most African countries gained
independence from 1960s onwards and there were only a few African countries who were
members of the UN during the 1950s.30
We can classify the votes by cold war topic. There were 921 votes relating to the
Palestinian conflict, 498 votes relating to nuclear weapons and nuclear material, 685 votes
relating to arms control and disarmament, 871 votes relating to colonialism, 843 votes relating
to human rights and 591 votes relating to (economic) development.
27Of course, there were some votes for which there was US/USSR alignment. One example is
the UN Security Council resolution calling on Israel to withdraw from Sinai Peninsula in October
1956.
28Available at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=hdl:1902.1/12379.
29One could also define the dependent variable with respect to the USSR. When US and the
USSR always vote differently and there are no countries that vote differently than both the US
and USSR, these two ways of defining the dependent variable would coincide. In practice, there
are instances of both. By necessity, we exclude all votes for which the US and USSR vote alike. In
a robustness check, we exclude those countries’ votes that disagree with both the US and USSR.
Results are unaltered.
30Alternative start and end points for the Cold War do not change our results. If anything,
adding 1950s strengthens the results, and there is little change if we move the end point earlier to
1989 or 1985.
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We also coded up various Cold War interventions in Africa by the superpowers. We
classified events affecting a particular country in a given year by eight intervention types,
whether the intervention was by the US or USSR, whether the intervention was economic or
military and whether the intervention was hostile or not.
6.2 Econometric specification
If our theory predicts Cold War alliances, then we would expect the focal partition to have
predictive power for UN voting patterns. In particular, we should reject the null hypothesis
that the coefficient on the indicator of the focal partition is zero. The labeling of the partition
is data driven as we code the indicator variable as PseudoWestern so that the partition
dummy is positively correlated with voting with the USA. Thus, our first test is merely to
investigate whether the pseudo-Western and Eastern Blocs have predictive power for UN
voting patterns. Specifically, we would like to know whether alignment in the focal partition
solution, on average, manifests a tendency to vote similarly as the USA (or the Soviet Union).
voteUSAit = α + β ∗ PseudoWesterni + ηt + εit (1)
Here, β, the average marginal effect of being aligned in the focal partition on voting with
the USA, is interpreted as the difference in the probabilities of voting with the USA between
the two blocs.31 Voting alignment is a function of the ‘tacit alignment’ of African countries
captured by our configuration of blocs, unobservable idiosyncratic (country-vote) factors,
country-specific preferences and vote-specific factors. Pseudo-Western bloc is defined to be
such that it is positively correlated with voting with the USA.
We next estimate the following specification:
voteUSAit = αi + γW ∗ PayoffUSA¬iSNit + γE ∗ PayoffUSSR¬iSNit + ηt + εit (2)
where i indexes countries and t indexes votes (where we control for vote and country
fixed effects).32 PayoffUSA¬iSN is calculated as follows:∑
∀j 6=i∩PseudoWestern
sisjdij ∗ voteUSAjt (3)
Whereas PayoffUSSR¬iSN is calculated as follows:
31We assume that E[ε|PseudoWestern, ηt] = 0.





sisjdij ∗ voteUSSRjt (4)
Here, the Payoffs are restricted to blocs and the labeling of the blocs is fixed from the
previous regression (i.e., the PseudoWestern indicator is positively related to US voting)
and γ is interpreted as the average marginal effect on the probability of voting with the
USA of a marginal change in the sum of the bilateral distances between countries in a bloc.
We expect the Pseudo-Western (Eastern) Payoff restricted to the intersection with Pseudo-
Western (Eastern) bloc of the focal partition to be negatively (positively) correlated with
voting with the USA.





where b is either USA or USSR.
In certain specifications, we also control for the Cold War interventions collected from
various sources. These include eight possible intervention types: East/West; Economic/Military;
Hostile/Non-hostile.
6.3 Validation results
In columns 1 and 2 of Table 4, we present the results of directly using an indicator for
which pseudo-group a country belongs to in the focal solution for all votes between 1960 and
1991, both unconditional (column 1) and controlling for the Cold War interventions (column
2). The coefficient of interest is positive (by design) and statistically significant at the 1%
level. Controlling for the Cold War interventions does not alter the coefficient, which can be
interpreted as an indication of the stability of the focal partition. The magnitude suggests
that being in the pseudo-Western Bloc means that the country is 1.5 percentage points more
likely to vote with the US than a country in the pseudo-Eastern Bloc in an average vote.
Given that the mean of the dependent variable is 15.5%, this effect is not small.
In columns 3 and 4, we present the results of using the Payoff in a vote’s realized partition
to predict a country’s voting alignment. As predicted, the coefficient on the Payoff in the
votes with the US bloc has a negative and statistically significant coefficient. A decrease of
one standard deviation in the sum of Pseudo-Western distances increases the likelihood of
voting with the US by 2.9 percentage points (26% of the mean). It is important to notice that
this is an order of magnitude larger than the effect of a Western hostile military intervention
(0.24 percentage points). Instead, an increase in one standard deviation of Pseudo-Eastern
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Table 4 Cold War Alliances and UN Voting Patterns
Dep. Var. = Vote with the US
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pseudo-Western Bloc 0.015 0.016
[0.001] [0.001]
Pseudo-Western Payoff (SN) -0.075 -0.074
[0.0035] [0.0036]
Pseudo-Eastern Payoff (SN) 0.026 0.025
[0.0013] [0.0013]
Pseudo-Western Payoff (Unrestricted) -0.001 -0.006
[0.005] [0.005]
Pseudo-Eastern Payoff (Unrestricted) 0.034 0.029
[0.004] [0.004]
βW + βE = 0: χ2(1) 3.27 3.32 0.75 0.48
SN = Unrestricted: χ2(1) 3.87 3.68
Cold War Interventions NO YES NO YES NO YES
Vote FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country FE NO NO YES YES YES YES
Sample Roll call votes between 1960-1991
Observations 99944 99944 99944 99944 99944 99944
Robust standard errors in brackets.
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energy increases the likelihood of voting with the US by 4.9 percentage points (43% of the
mean), nearly an order of magnitude larger than the effect size of an Eastern non-hostile
economic intervention (-0.66 percentage points).
In columns 5 and 6, we present the results with unrestricted Payoffs. As hypothesized
above, unrestricted Payoff does not have good predictive power for the voting patterns.
Pseudo-Western Payoff is both economically and statistically insignificant. And the test of
whether the summation of the coefficients of the Pseudo-Western Payoff and the Pseudo-
Eastern Payoff is zero cannot be rejected. A following test also reveals that the Pareto
efficient coefficients are statistically different than the unrestricted coefficients. All in all,
the results from Table 4 reveal that the Payoff restricted to the focal partition outperforms
Payoff of a particular vote configuration.
6.4 Stability and Propensity Score
In this section, we explore the stability of other equilibria in the game and how stability is
related to the UN voting patterns. Up to this point, we have focused on the focal partition.
As we have previously argued, the stability of the focal partition is critical in providing
predictive power in the Cold War environment. If our concerns about stability are warranted,
then we should expect that equilibria that are less stable than SNE to have less predictive
power when analyzing UN voting patterns. In Figure 2, we present the marginal effects
of these partitions (inferring the bloc from the sign as before). Importantly, we present
both with and without intervention controls as we would expect the controls to affect the
magnitude and even the sign of the coefficients of less stable equilibria. We see that the
magnitude of the focal partition (represented by the dashed line) is larger than all the
relatively stable NE. In addition, most of the marginal effects are sensitive to Cold War
interventions.
In Figure 3 instead, we present the total effect of Payoff (inferring the bloc from the
sign as before). Again, we see that the magnitude is much larger for the effects of the focal
partition. In addition, several effects of Payoff are positive which goes against the theoretical
prediction. This exercise reinforces our confidence in the focal partition and its predictive
power for our results.
Finally, looking at the data in a slightly different way is instructive for our approach. Im-
portant for our analysis is that the focal partition does not correlate with individual country
observable or unobservable variables that might be correlated with development outcomes
and treatment status. By using propensity score methods, we can compare countries of
different blocs with similar likelihoods of being treated. The UN voting alignment gives a
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Effect of partition Effect of partition conditional on Cold War events
Notes: This figure plots the estimates of the effects of the partition for all equilibria that are k-
stable for k > 1. The equilibria are arranged in descending order of stability and energy. The
dashed line represents the effect of focal partition.









-.05 -.04 -.03 -.02 -.01 0 .01 .02 .03 .04 .05
Effect of Payoff Effect of Payoff conditional on Cold War events
Notes: This figure plots the estimates of the effects of Payoff (the sum of the coefficients on
PayoffUS and PayoffUSSR) for all equilibria that are k-stable for k > 1. The equilibria are
arranged in descending order of stability and energy. The dashed line represents the effect of focal
Payoff.
powerful tool to construct the propensity score. We regress UN voting alignment on country
and vote fixed effects (excluding the focal partition indicator) to estimate each country’s
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likelihood of aligning with the West (or East) and hence of being assigned treatment.
Table 5 presents correlations between the values of the country fixed effects and the various
Nash equilibria that are greater than 1-stable. The focal partition is positively correlated
and statistically significant at the 10% level, which is what we would expect given the
previous analysis. However, what is not expected and serves to bolster the confidence in our
approach is the fact that all the other partitions’ correlations are statistically insignificant
at conventional levels, uniformly distributed around zero and less than the magnitude of the
focal partition’s correlation. Since these are solutions to the game of social interactions, albeit
ones that satisfy fewer attractive game-theoretic properties, it is clear that there is no pre-
ordained relationship between solutions to the game and voting outcomes. Put differently,
the pre-determined characteristics that make up the payoff of distances do not necessarily
correlate with the probability of being treated in other equilibrium partitions than the focal
one.
Table 5 Stable Nash Equilibria and Correlation with Country Fixed Effects
2-stable 1 2-stable 2 2-stable 3 2-stable 4 2-stable 5 3-stable 1 3-stable 2 7-stable SNE
Correlation 0.15 -0.08 -0.13 -0.11 0.16 0.07 0.04 -0.09 0.18
p-value 0.14 0.47 0.23 0.28 0.12 0.51 0.68 0.40 0.08
Notes: SNE stands for strong Nash equilibrium.
6.5 Robustness checks
In this subsection, we explore whether our results are robust to reasonable variations.
The intensity of the Cold War influence on Africa varied over time. In the historical
section, we argued that the Cold War experience should have a stronger and more bipolar
influence earlier in the Cold War. Table A.1 presents results on the effects of the focal
partition for different time periods. Indeed, we find a stronger effect for the 1950s and 1960s
than for subsequent periods.
Our results are robust to restricting the sample to those votes on salient and relevant
Cold War issues (Table A.2). Relevant votes are those identified by the UN relating to the
Palestinian conflict, nuclear weapons and nuclear material, arms control and disarmament,
colonialism, human rights, (economic) development, plus any of the votes concerning issues
related to China, Korea, Cuba, Tibet and Hungary as identified by Gareau (1970), and those
votes identified as important by the U.S. State Department report Voting Practices in the
United Nations.
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We also explore how our results change if we exclude those country-votes that disagree
with both the US and USSR. This exercise should make our results more precise. We observe
in Table A.3 that the results are qualitatively the same.
The last robustness check that we undertake is using an alternative matrix of bilateral
distances between countries. We modify the bilateral distances by adding the dimension of
pre-colonial governance. Gennaioli and Rainer (2007) show that pre-colonial institutions
affect the success of modernization policies in Africa. We use jurisdictional hierarchy,
measured at the ethnographic society level (Murdock, 1965). We first average these to
the country level, and then, take the absolute difference between the average jurisdictional
hierarchy levels of two countries. We finally normalize it to lie between zero and one. This
added dimension should better ground the bilateral distances in deep-rooted institutional
factors that affect the propensity to cooperate. We then again solve for the maximizer of the
weighted sum of payoffs and this gives us a new alignment for the focal partition. The results
are quantitatively and qualitatively similar and, if anything, are stronger (see Table A.4).
6.6 Randomization inference
We perform randomized inference exercises by randomly drawing a partition and substituting
this partition for the focal partition. The advantage of randomized inference in this setting
is that it provides valid p-values under the null hypothesis that there is no effect. The
randomization assigns equal probabilities of being assigned to the pseudo-Western (denoted
by one) and pseudo-Eastern groups (denoted by zero). We construct 1000 such partitions
and then rerun our UN voting regressions.
Figure 4 shows the results of 1000 placebo partitions on the probability of voting with
the US, where the estimated effect of the focal partition is marked with a vertical solid line.
More than 90% of the regressions produce an effect size that is smaller than what we observe
for the focal partition, reassuring us about its predictive power.
We now turn to the estimates based on Payoffs. In Figure 5, we present a scatter plot of
each pair of placebo effects of both PayoffUS and PayoffUSSR, where Payoffs are calculated
as before. It is particularly apparent that our results represent an extreme value vis-a-vis
the placebo effects.
In Figure 6, we present the simulations for the main result. This figure plots the pair
of estimates of the effects of 1000 simulations coming from placebo partitions. For each
simulation, a random partition is drawn that becomes a placebo partition and is therefore
fixed for the whole period. Then, the Payoffs are constructed as before for the placebo
partition. We sum the effects and then multiple by negative one for ease of interpretability.
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Placebo Alliance Effect
Notes: This figure plots the estimates of the effects of 1000 placebo partitions on the probability
of voting with the US. For each simulation, a random partition is drawn that becomes a placebo
Pareto efficient partition and is therefore fixed for the whole period. The estimated effect for the
focal partition is marked with a vertical solid red line. The horizontal dotted red line indicates the
90% level.
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Effect of Payoff of US bloc
Scatter plot of placebo alliance effects
Notes: This figure plots the pair of estimates of the effects of the Payoffs for 1000 placebo
simulations. For each simulation, a random partition is drawn that becomes a placebo partition
and is therefore fixed for the whole period. Then, the Payoffs are constructed as before for the
placebo partition. The pair of estimates for the focal partition is marked with a red “X”.
The resulting estimated effects are interpreted as the marginal change in the likelihood of
voting with the US when the energy of the USSR bloc is increased relative to the energy of
the US bloc. The estimated effect for the focal partition is marked with a vertical solid line.
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The horizontal dotted red line indicates the 90% level. It is clear that the effect of the focal
partition is markedly different than the placebo effects.
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The sum of the effects of the payoffs of the US bloc and the USSR bloc
Notes: This figure plots the estimates of the effects from 1000 simulations on the probability of
voting with the US. For each simulation, a random partition is drawn that becomes a placebo
partition and is therefore fixed for the whole period. Then, the Payoffs are constructed as before
for the placebo partition. We sum the effects and then multiple by negative one for the ease of
interpretability. The estimated effects of the interpretation of the marginal change in the likelihood
of voting with the US when the Payoff of the USSR bloc is increased relative to the Payoff of the
US bloc. The estimated effect for the focal partition is marked with a vertical solid red line. The
horizontal dotted red line indicates the 90% level.
7 The Cold War and Development Clusters
Having established in the previous section that our game of social interactions predicts
political alliances as measured by UN voting patterns, we now turn to the main objective
of this paper. Given that the Cold War coincided with post-WWII independence for many
African countries and that the superpowers had ideological differences in their preferred
modes of economic organization, one might expect that strategic political alliances would
have constrained subsequent development trajectories. In this section, we provide evidence
on whether these Cold War alliances produce development clusters in Africa today.
Our analysis relies on sorting the conditional expectation of various measures related
to economic development according to whether our game and validation exercise assign a
country to the Western-aligned group or the Eastern-aligned one. The first such cluster to
consider is naturally based on GDP per capita, which we term the winners-and-losers cluster.
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David C. Engerman provides succinct motivation for this hypothesis: “Widespread desire for
higher levels of economic production, as well as conflicts over the path to higher production,
defined the shape of international relations in the Cold War as well as the experiences of those
who lived through it (Engerman, 2004).” The Western superpower believed that capitalism
would ultimately lead to sustained economic growth and communism would ultimately be a
failure. In contrast, the Eastern superpower believed that an economy based on communism
would be able to catch up and surpass capitalist economies. One might expect that the
countries that aligned with the West, as the victor of the Cold War, to have a higher level
of development than those that aligned with the East.
Hypothesis 1. Western-aligned countries have greater income per capita than Eastern-
aligned countries.
This first hypothesis is purely about the level of development. However, given the
stark ideological differences involved in the Cold War, the focal partition may also have
influenced the shape of development by changing intermediate and primary inputs in the
development process. Therefore, the second development cluster that we consider is based
on the different development paths chosen and encouraged by the superpowers. The Western
mode, organized on the basis of capitalism, relies on the market economy to allocate resources
and requires basic freedoms to support decentralized decision-making. The Eastern mode,
organized on the basis of communism, focused instead on the perfection and equality of man
and centralized decision-making. While both development paths could have had similar
objectives as investing in human capital, promoting democratic governance and encouraging
large-scale investment, we argue that we can distinguish between the two, first and foremost,
using a development cluster based on economic inequality (the inequality cluster) and one
based on the market economy and financial penetration (market cluster). Following Bergson
(1984), we consider the level of economic inequality and financial penetration as two necessary
distinguishing features of the prototypical economies associated with each Cold War bloc.
Hypothesis 2. Western-aligned countries have greater income inequality and financial
penetration than Eastern-aligned countries.
Pushing the development narratives further, we also expect to see systematic differences
across the two groups in terms of human capital, physical capital and institutions. The
constrained optimization of these two different aggregate production functions likely implied
qualitatively and quantitatively different levels and types of investments. After all, the two
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sides clashed over the methods of reaching greater production and development (Engerman,
2004). For example, according to Lenin, Kommunizm = Soveck Vlast~ +
lektrifikac (“Communism is Soviet power plus electrification”). Taken quite literally,
this would imply a different set of investments than the Western formula for successful
capitalist development, which emphasized investment in public goods, protection of private
property rights and democratic governance. Since human capital, physical capital and
institutions were important factors in the development strategies of both of the superpowers,
it is difficult to definitively sign which side would outperform the other in these development
outcomes. However, we can meaningfully test against the null of no effect.
Hypothesis 3. Western-aligned countries have systematically different levels of human
capital, physical capital and institutional quality than Eastern-aligned countries.
To test these hypotheses, we run regressions using country-level data, averaged over the
post-Cold War period until today, of the following form:
Outcomeji = α
j + βj ∗ PseudoWesterni + δj ∗GDPp.c.1950i + ε
j
i (5)
We test Hypothesis 1 by regressing average GDP p.c. on the PseudoWestern indicator,
controlling for initial GDP p.c.. The coefficient on the Pseudo-Western variable is the effect
of interest and we test this hypothesis against the null hypothesis that Pseudo-Western
has no impact on the level of development. Hypothesis 2 is tested by running a seemingly
unrelated regression for inequality and financial penetration as two outcomes. We then test
the joint significance of the two βj’s.33 Hypothesis 3 is tested in a similar way as Hypothesis
1, although we remain agnostic about the expected sign.
7.1 Main results
For the reader’s convenience, we show results for a range of possible development outcomes.
Table 6 shows the OLS estimate of the relationship between Pareto-efficient alignment and
different types of development outcomes, conditional on initial levels of GDP per capita.
We have split these variables into three panels. In Panels A, B and C of Table 6,
respectively, we consider standard development outcomes, outcomes that should reflect
differences in development policies, and institutional outcomes.
The first and second columns of Panel A show that initial economic outcomes were
not correlated with the alignment. We test Hypothesis 1 in column 3. We find that the
33Alternatively, we also employ a bootstrap procedure to perform a joint, one-sided test.
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Table 6 Cold War Alliances and Long-run Outcomes
Panel A:
Dep. Var. = GDP Life Exp. GDP Life Exp. Poverty Measles Immunity Urban Share
per capita At Birth per capita At birth Head Count Ratio of Population
(1950) (1965) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Pseudo-Western Bloc 183.77 1.91 -381.95 -4.88 6.88 4.67 -7.29
(Strong Nash) [144.005] [1.414] [1,404.311] [1.880] [6.322] [5.030] [4.313]
GDP per capita, 1950 0.01 4.47 0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.02
(Maddison) [0.002] [0.863] [0.002] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004]
Observations 45 45 44 45 41 45 45
R-squared 0.037 0.387 0.186 0.318 0.331 0.050 0.250
Panel B:
Dep. Var. = Income Financial Net ODA Adult Literacy Educ. Exp. Gender Parity Access to
Inequality Account Holders Rate % Govt. Exp. Index (Educ.) Electricity
(Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Pseudo-Western Bloc 5.37 9.90 16.75 19.90 1.92 0.09 -14.12
(Strong Nash) [2.022] [3.965] [6.402] [4.491] [0.985] [0.042] [7.642]
GDP per capita, 1950 -0.00 0.02 -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04
(Maddison) [0.003] [0.005] [0.007] [0.003] [0.001] [0.000] [0.006]
Observations 41 41 45 44 43 44 45
R-squared 0.143 0.498 0.131 0.440 0.096 0.208 0.337
Panel C:
Dep. Var. = Govt. Exp. Agriculture Share Polity IV Disappearances Rule of Law Govt. Effectiveness Corruption
% GDP of Value Added Index CIRI WGI WGI TI
(Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2010) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Pseudo-Western Bloc 2.25 -1.82 2.30 -0.03 -0.10 -0.05 0.19
(Strong Nash) [1.372] [4.465] [1.262] [0.142] [0.196] [0.179] [0.283]
GDP per capita, 1950 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(Maddison) [0.001] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 44 44 45 45 45 45 45
R-squared 0.112 0.232 0.127 0.003 0.110 0.182 0.207
Robust standard errors in brackets.
PseudoWestern alliance did not lead to greater income, leading us to fail to reject the null,
and we must tentatively abandon Hypothesis 1 since we find no evidence in favor of the Cold
War producing a winners-and-losers development cluster in Africa. If anything, the Pseudo-
Western alliance performed worse in some of the standard development indicators, with
lower life expectancy and urbanization. In terms of improvements in poverty and measles
immunity, there is no systematic difference.
Intermediary outcomes, however, differ (Panels B and C of Table 6). Western-allied
have greater inequality and deeper financial penetration (columns 1 and 2 of Panel B).
Our joint significance test of Hypothesis 2 gives a χ2 statistic of 10.1 with a p-value of
0.006.34 Therefore, we can reject the null hypothesis and tentatively accept Hypothesis 2.
34The bootstrap procedure yields 10 out of 1000 cases in which at least one of the βj ’s is less
than or equal to zero, giving a p-value of 0.01.
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The Cold War appears to have indeed produced development clusters in Africa in line with
the ideological objectives of the superpowers. Western-aligned also have received greater
amounts of official development assistance (Net ODA, column 3 of Panel B). Western-allied
have greater human capital, measured by the literacy rate and gender parity in primary and
secondary education, coupled with greater education expenditure share in the government
budget. In contrast, the Western-allied seem to have lower infrastructure, proxied by
electrification.
Finally, in Panel C, we observe that while government’s size and the emphasis on a
strong agricultural economy do not differ, the Western-allied do better in certain political
institutions, such as democratic rights. Supporting this, column 3 of Panel C suggests that
the Western-allied have on average a higher democracy score. Evaluating Hypothesis 3 in
light of the findings from Panels B and C, we can state that there are systematically different
levels of human capital, physical capital and political institutional quality between the two
groups. The Western-allied have greater democracy and human capital, while their level of
electrification is lower.
Taking stock of the literature and these results, greater democracy, human capital,
and financial penetration might suggest better economic outcomes going forward in the
former Western-allied countries. However, this could be counteracted by a lower level of
infrastructure and the potential negative impact of income inequality.
7.2 Propensity score estimation
Since our theoretical approach simply creates two blocs without assigning treatment, each
country has the same ex-ante probability of receiving treatment. Then, the ex-interim
assignment using UN voting alignment could violate the unconfoundedness assumption if
individual country’s voting alignment is correlated with factors that are correlated with
development outcomes conditional on treatment. In particular, the true effect of the focal
partition may be null, but due to its correlation with UN voting, we may reject the null
hypothesis if unaccounted for factors (in our case, this is basically anything not accounted for
by initial level of GDP per capita) that are correlated with UN voting, including UN Voting
itself, are correlated with development outcomes. Fortunately, we can use propensity score
methods to control for the difference in the probability of treatment assignment. Figure 7
shows the distribution of the propensity score for Pseudo-Eastern and Pseudo-Western blocs.
The overlap is considerable and the distribution for the Pseudo-Western is, as expected, on
the right of the distribution for the Pseudo-Eastern bloc. There are six countries outside
the common support, but only one or two countries in PseudoWestern group have values
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that are relatively high. For the analysis below, to keep the degrees of freedom as high as
possible, we leave all these countries in the estimation, but all our results are robust to their
exclusion.
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x
PseudoWestern PseudoEastern
Notes: Normal transformation of the value of the point estimate of a country fixed effect in a
regression of UN voting alignment on country and vote fixed effects. We use a transformation
because some fixed effects are negative by construction. Similar results are obtained taking a
uniform transformation.
Given that we have relatively small number of observations, we prefer to present several
approaches to the propensity score, each with their own advantages and disadvantages. In
particular, we use the propensity score as weights (in Panel A of Table 7), simply controlling
for the propensity score (in Panel B of Table 7), and nearest neighbor matching on the
propensity score and initial level of GDP p.c. (in Panel C of Table 7). We present the
results for the main outcomes of interest related to the three hypotheses, relegating other
outcomes to the appendix.35
If anything, our results become stronger when we account for the likelihood of being
treated. Again, we fail to reject the null for the winner/losers clusters in all three approaches
with even smaller point estimates (column 1). We confirm the inequality and market clusters
and the effects are more precisely estimated (columns 2 and 3). Moreover, in line with our
third hypothesis, pseudo-Western countries have higher human capital (columns 4 and 5)
and democracy (column 7), with lower infrastructure (column 6). Therefore, differences in
time-invariant observable and unobservable factors that affect the likelihood of being treated
do not explain away the relationships that we uncover. Of course, we can not entirely rule
35In the appendix, we report each outcome in Table A.6 using each estimation method.
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out the possibility that there is some factor that changed post-1991 that is correlated with
the focal partition and development outcomes.
Table 7 Cold War Alliances and Long-run Outcomes: Propensity Score Estimation
Panel A: Propensity Score Weights
Dep. Var. = GDP Income Financial Adult Literacy Gender Parity Access to Polity IV
per capita Inequality Account Holders Rate Index (Educ.) Electricity Index
(Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Pseudo-Western Bloc (Strong Nash) -352.50 5.22 9.97 19.98 0.09 -13.85 2.23
[1,380.563] [2.011] [3.973] [4.472] [0.042] [7.600] [1.253]
GDP per capita, 1950 4.42 -0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00
[0.896] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003] [0.000] [0.007] [0.002]
Observations 44 41 41 44 44 45 45
R-squared 0.177 0.138 0.482 0.433 0.200 0.327 0.114
Panel B: Controlling for Propensity Score
Dep. Var. = GDP Income Financial Adult Literacy Gender Parity Access to Polity IV
per capita Inequality Account Holders Rate Index (Educ.) Electricity Index
(Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Pseudo-Western Bloc (Strong Nash) -321.74 4.95 9.93 20.09 0.09 -13.42 2.05
[1,367.486] [1.941] [4.127] [4.507] [0.042] [7.574] [1.222]
GDP per capita, 1950 4.64 -0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00
[1.007] [0.003] [0.005] [0.004] [0.000] [0.007] [0.002]
Propensity score -8,483.87 109.24 -4.47 -26.62 0.34 -109.31 39.12
[15,014.634] [23.578] [57.994] [52.768] [0.412] [90.644] [14.565]
Observations 44 41 41 44 44 45 45
R-squared 0.188 0.313 0.498 0.441 0.212 0.347 0.185
Panel C: Nearest Neighbor Matching on Propensity Score and initial GDP p.c.
Dep. Var. = GDP Income Financial Adult Literacy Gender Parity Access to Polity IV
per capita Inequality Account Holders Rate Index (Educ.) Electricity Index
(Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Pseudo-Western Bloc (Strong Nash) -357.04 6.03 12.14 21.75 0.10 -10.87 2.85
[1,517.334] [2.039] [4.169] [4.790] [0.041] [7.998] [1.579]
Observations 44 41 41 44 44 45 45
Robust standard errors in brackets.
7.3 Robustness checks
Given the small sample, we are limited in the types of robustness checks that we can
do. First, we perform randomization inference exercises as before by randomly drawing a
partition and substituting it for the focal one. As discussed above, this procedure performs
valid inference when there are few treatment clusters as is our case. In 1000 regressions
of a corresponding outcome from Table 6 on placebo partitions, our conclusions above are
confirmed (see Figure A.1 in the Online Appendix). The only difference is that government
expenditure share seems to be higher for pseudo-Western allied.
Second, we rerun our main specifications with a set of control variables, each added
one at a time, for each outcome in Table 6. The set of control variables corresponds to
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the country-level counterparts of the components that make up the pairwise payoff matrix.
This exercise assesses the robustness of the correlations between the focal partition and
the development outcomes. A summary of the results is presented in Table A.5. We code
a zero for when the sign and statistical significance of the correlation between the focal
partition and the development outcome (in rows) remain unchanged with the inclusion of
the control variable (in columns) and a one for when there is such a change. Importantly,
the key outcomes that bifurcate the development clusters along the two stylized paths of
development mostly remain unchanged. The last two columns report the proportion of tests
that result in a change, one for all factors and one that excludes factors that have a relatively
high correlation with the focal partition. In short, we interpret this summary of results as
rather strong evidence that the correlations are robust.
Finally, in Table A.7, we present results from running our main outcome variables
averaged by each of the three post-Cold War decades. The results are consistent with the
impact of the Cold War having a persistent effect. The one exception is the gender parity
index since the effect of the Cold War appears to fade over time. This is most likely due to
the global push toward gender equality.
8 Conclusion
International alliances in Africa during the Cold War were fluid and dynamic. Yet, we
uncover a stable and efficient structure to these alliances using a game of social interactions
that takes payoffs based on similarities across a set of predetermined characteristics. We
then use this structure to assign a treatment of Cold War political alignment that has strong
theoretical and empirical justification for the exogeneity assumption. We find that the treat-
ment of Cold War alignment produces development clusters in Africa today. Surprisingly,
we find no evidence that the Cold War treatment resulted in a cluster of winners and losers.
Specifically, we find that there is no statistically significant difference in GDP per capita
between Western-assigned and Eastern-assigned countries. However, Cold War alignment did
produce an inequality cluster and a market cluster that is in line with the superpowers’ self-
professed development objectives. Western-assigned countries have greater income inequality
and financial penetration than Eastern-assigned countries. The magnitudes are economically
significant: the impacts on inequality and financial penetration correspond to jumps from
the median to the 75th percentile and to the 70th percentile, respectively. Moreover,
Western and Eastern countries also differ in their human and physical capital as well as
institutions. Western-assigned countries have greater human capital and democracy, with
lower infrastructure levels.
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In sum, our findings suggest that important intermediary outcomes for long-run growth,
such as human capital, financial penetration and democratic institutions, favor pseudo-
Western-bloc African countries. However, the effect of those factors has been mitigated
by greater inequality. It is important to understand this conclusion by recalling that, in our
theoretical setting, the formation of two blocs is not a result of direct actions or influence
of the superpowers at any point in time. The focal partition is a latent structure that
influences the course of events. While we do not rule out superpowers’ interventions as a
mechanism, Cold War politics could equally have served an indirect causal role by shaping
the common lens through which these two groups of countries viewed the difficult problem
of decolonization and development.
Our findings support the growing empirical literature on how historical variables affect
outcomes today and provide some evidence for the “past of the present” thesis (Cooper,
2002). The predetermined characteristics that we use to predict alignment are themselves
aggregators of the past and interact with the Cold War environment to influence post-
independence development paths and present outcomes.
The enduring impact of the Cold War underscores the importance of politics in the
process of development and points to the need for more research on the Cold War as a “third
world” phenomenon. Politics typically restricts the feasible set of policy options and the Cold
War is a particularly stark example. In reality, Cold War politics may have afforded African
countries a greater range of policy choices than our bifurcation suggests. The nonaligned
movement is one potential candidate to coalesce development policies through strategic po-
litical alliances, leading to potentially a more refined understanding of development clusters.
To what extent the nonaligned movement affected the latent structure of political alliances
in Africa is an empirical question and we have research underway to determine whether two
or three groups better represent UN voting patterns.
Our engagement with history in this paper deserves some further discussion. This
literature often employs a narrow concept of history, typically for the purposes of identi-
fication, by equating a particular history with a quasi-experimental intervention. This use of
history contrasts starkly with a more complex, process-oriented view that models history
as a highly differentiated product that resists aggregation and quantification (Diamond
and Robinson, 2010). Historians embrace multiplicity and require contextual and process-
oriented information to comment on causality (Landes, 1994). Our work presents a middle
ground in the spirit of Greif and Laitin (2004). We consider all possible configurations of
Cold War alignment, 247 of them to be precise, and then use a theoretical model of social
interactions to wade through this multiplicity to arrive at treatment assignment. In this
sense, we allow for an endogenous, process-oriented meaning of historical events, but we also
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extract from history a microfounded, quantifiable and identifiable causal factor that can be
used to understand the aggregate impact of history on economic and political outcomes today.
In our context, the focal partition is particularly intriguing as an aggregator of historical
processes because of its special game-theoretic properties of stability and efficiency.
Finally, our approach can be extended to other important contexts, many of which are
now computationally feasible due to recent advances in the operations research literature on
the MaxCut problem. Pairwise hedonic heterogeneity is also used (implicitly or explicitly)
in examination of ethnic conflicts (see, e.g., Duclos et al. (2004), Esteban and Ray (2008a,b,
2011), Horowitz (1985), Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), Reynal-Querol (2002)). In the
analysis of conflict and cooperation among ethnic groups, the major concern is to understand
the causes of civil wars or other forms of violent bilateral or multilateral disputes among these
groups. The methodology used to analyze the war proneness of the international system can
be applied for the examination of this problem. The current research on this topic emphasizes
the role of heterogeneity across groups. If a civil war is viewed as a coalition formation game
with two sides, the framework developed here could be useful as well.
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A.1 Data for the Partition Matrix
Contiguity Data on contiguity can be accessed on CEPII’s or Thierry Mayer’s webpage
(http://econ.sciences-po.fr/node/131). While constructing the distance index, we
employ (1-contiguity) to render the variable in distance terms.
Common colonizer Data on common colonizer can be accessed on CEPII’s or Thierry
Mayer’s webpage (http://econ.sciences-po.fr/node/131). While constructing the dis-
tance index, we employ (1-common colonizer) to render the variable in distance terms.
Log of Geodesic distance Data on geodesic distance can be accessed on CEPII’s or
Thierry Mayer’s webpage (http://econ.sciences-po.fr/node/131). We normalize the
log distance to lie between zero and one.
Genetic distance Genetic distance is a measure of distance to the most recent common
ancestors of two populations, i.e. their degree of genealogical relatedness, or equivalently,
the length of time since two populations split apart (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009). This
measure of genetic distance, also called FST distance, is constructed using information on
128 alleles related to 45 selectively neutral genes. It includes alleles coding for blood groups,
immunoglobulin, hemoglobin, enzymes and lymphocyte antigens. We refer the interested
reader to Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) for a more comprehensive overview and a formal
definition of genetic distance. See also Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994).
By measuring the time since two populations shared common ancestors, genetic distance
provides an ideal summary of differences in slowly changing genealogically transmitted
cultural characteristics, including habits and customs (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009). We
normalize the variable to lie between zero and one.
Linguistic distance Data on linguistic distance are based on Spolaore and Wacziarg
(2015). We normalize the variable to lie between zero and one.
Religious distance Data on religious distance are based on Spolaore and Wacziarg (2015).
We normalize the variable to lie between zero and one.
1
National Material Capabilities We employ National Material Capabilities data set from
the Correlates of War Project. The widely-used Composite Index of National Capability
(CINC) index is based on six variables in the data set: total population, urban population,
iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel, and military expenditure
of all state members. We normalize the variable to lie between zero and one. For details see
also Singer (1988) and Singer et al. (1972).
A.2 Data for Development Outcomes
GDP per capita These data are from the World Development Indicators Database of
the World Bank. GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population.
Data are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars.
Life Expectancy at Birth These data are from the Africa Development Indicators
Database of the World Bank. Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a
newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to
stay the same throughout its life.
Poverty Head Count Ratio These data are from the Millennium Development Goals
Database of the World Bank. National poverty headcount ratio is the percentage of the pop-
ulation living below the national poverty lines. National estimates are based on population-
weighted subgroup estimates from household surveys.
Measles Immunity These data are from the Statistical Capacity Indicators Database of
the World Bank. The proportion of one-year-old children immunized against measles, which
is the proportion of children aged one who received one dose of measles vaccine.
Urban Share of Population These data are from the World Development Indicators
Database of the World Bank. Urban population refers to people living in urban areas as
defined by national statistical offices.
Income Inequality (Gini) These data are from the Africa Development Indicators Database
of the World Bank. Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in
some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy
deviates from a perfectly equal distribution.
2
Financial Account Holders These data are from the World Development Indicators
Database of the World Bank. Account at a financial institution denotes the percentage of
respondents who report having an account (by themselves or together with someone else) at
a bank or another type of financial institution.
Net ODA (Official Development Assistance) These data are from the Africa De-
velopment Indicators Database of the World Bank. Net official development assistance
(ODA) consists of disbursements of loans made on concessional terms (net of repayments of
principal) and grants by official agencies of the members of the Development Assistance
Committee (DAC), by multilateral institutions, and by non-DAC countries to promote
economic development and welfare in countries and territories in the DAC list of ODA
recipients.
Adult Literacy Rate These data are from the Education Statistics Database of the World
Bank. Percentage of the population age 15 and above who can, with understanding, read
and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life.
Education Expenditure as a Share of Government Expenditure These data are
from the Education Statistics Database of the World Bank. Total general (local, regional and
central) government expenditure on education (current, capital, and transfers), expressed
as a percentage of total general government expenditure on all sectors (including health,
education, social services, etc.).
Gender Parity Index (Education) These data are from the Education Statistics Database
of the World Bank. Ratio of female gross enrollment ratio for primary and secondary to male
gross enrollment ratio for primary and secondary.
Access to Electricity These data are from the World Development Indicators Database
of the World Bank. Access to electricity is the percentage of population with access to
electricity.
Government Expenditure as a Share of GDP These data are from the World De-
velopment Indicators Database of the World Bank. General government final consumption
expenditure (formerly general government consumption) includes all government current
expenditures for purchases of goods and services (including compensation of employees).
3
Agriculture Share of Value Added (% of GDP) These data are from the World
Development Indicators Database of the World Bank. Agriculture corresponds to ISIC
divisions 1-5 and includes forestry, hunting, and fishing, as well as cultivation of crops and
livestock production. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs
and subtracting intermediate inputs.
Polity IV Index These data are from the Africa Development Indicators Database of the
World Bank. The Combined Polity score is computed by subtracting the AUTOCRACY
score from the DEMOCRACY score; the resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10
(strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic).
Disappearances CIRI These data are from the CIRI Human Rights Data Project Database.
Disappearances are cases in which people have disappeared, political motivation appears
likely, and the victims have not been found. Knowledge of the whereabouts of the disap-
peared is, by definition, not public knowledge. However, while there is typically no way
of knowing where victims are, it is typically known by whom they were taken and under
what circumstances. A score of 0 indicates that disappearances have occurred frequently in
a given year; a score of 1 indicates that disappearances occasionally occurred; and a score of
2 indicates that disappearances did not occur in a given year.
Rule of Law WGI These data are from the World Governance Indicators Database of
the World Bank. Rule of Law measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and
abide by the rules of society, in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police,
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Coded from -2.5 to 2.5 with
higher values corresponding with better governance outcomes.
Government Effectiveness WGI These data are from the World Governance Indicators
Database of the World Bank. Government Effectiveness measures the quality of public
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the
government’s commitment to such policies. Coded from -2.5 to 2.5 with higher values
corresponding with better governance outcomes.
Corruption TI These data are from the Africa Development Indicators Database of
the World Bank. This information is from the http://www.transparency.org Transparency
International web site. More information may be available there. Corruption Perception
4
Index score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and
country analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).
A.3 Data for the Cold War Interventions
These data come from a variety of sources: government documents, such as declassified CIA
documents and U.S. treaty agreements, expert reports, books and articles (Porter, 1984;
Schmidt, 2013; Shubin, 2007), and online sources (http://countrystudies.us , http://www.country-
data.com, etc.). Each intervention is categorized by which superpower intervened, the
type of intervention and whether this intervention was hostile. The type of intervention is
either military (arms deliveries or sales, military training, invasion, etc.) or economic (e.g.,
economic aid, non-military technical assistance and training , etc.). Hostility is determined
by whether the intervention was approved of by the recipient country.
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Notes: This figure plots the estimates of the effects of 1000 placebo partitions on the corresponding
outcome variables as in Table 6. For each simulation, a random partition is drawn that becomes a
placebo partition. The estimated effect for the focal partition is marked with a vertical solid red
line. The horizontal dotted red line indicates the 90% level.
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Table A.1 Cold War Alliances and UN Voting Patterns by Decade
Dep. Var. = Vote with the US
1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s post-1990
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Pseudo-Western Bloc 0.279 0.075 0.024 -0.0003 -0.001
(0.021) (0.0071) (0.0027) (0.0011) (0.00097)
Pseudo-Western Payoff -0.686 -0.201 -0.044 -0.067 -0.042
(0.067) (0.014) (0.0047) (0.0062) (0.0057)
Pseudo-Eastern Payoff 0.169 0.066 0.011 0.025 0.013
(0.033) (0.0057) (0.0017) (0.0026) (0.0034)
Vote FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country FE NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 1818 1818 12456 12456 27987 27987 53906 53906 54932 54932
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A.2 Cold War Alliances and UN Voting Patterns, Robustness to Restricting the
Sample to Relevant Votes
Dep. Var. = Vote with the US
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pseudo-Western Bloc 0.0097 0.011
(0.0015) (0.0015)
Pseudo-Western Payoff -0.08 -0.079
(0.0047) (0.0047)
Pseudo-Eastern Payoff 0.025 0.024
(0.0017) (0.0017)
Cold War Interventions NO YES NO YES
Vote FE YES YES YES YES
Country FE NO NO YES YES
Sample Relevant roll call votes between 1960-1991
Observations 67533 67533 67533 67533
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Relevant votes are those identified by the UN relating to the Palestinian
conflict, nuclear weapons and nuclear material, arms control and disarmament,
colonialism, human rights, (economic) development, plus any of the votes
concerning issues related to China, Korea, Cuba, Tibet and Hungary as
identified by (Gareau, 1970), and those votes identified as important by the
U.S. State Department report Voting Practices in the United Nations.
11
Table A.3 Cold War Alliances and UN Voting Patterns, Robustness to Excluding Countries
That Do Not Agree with the US or the USSR
Dep. Var. = Vote with the US
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pseudo-Western Bloc 0.015 0.016
(0.001) (0.001)
Pseudo-Western Payoff -0.066 -0.065
(0.003) (0.003)
Pseudo-Eastern Payoff 0.021 0.020
(0.001) (0.001)
Cold War Interventions NO YES NO YES
Vote FE YES YES YES YES
Country FE NO NO YES YES
Sample Roll call votes between 1960-1991
Observations 89050 89050 89050 89050
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A.4 Cold War Alliances and UN Voting Patterns, Robustness to Accounting for Pre-
Colonial Institutions in the Partition
Dep. Var. = Vote with the US
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pseudo-Western Bloc 0.020 0.020
(0.001) (0.001)
Pseudo-Western Payoff -0.094 -0.092
(0.004) (0.004)
Pseudo-Eastern Payoff 0.031 0.029
(0.001) (0.001)
Cold War Interventions NO YES NO YES
Vote FE YES YES YES YES
Country FE NO NO YES YES
Sample Roll call votes between 1960-1991
Observations 92368 92368 92368 92368
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A.5 Robustness of Development Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Size Ethnic Religious Landlocked Tropics Malaria Dominant Official Official Official Official Proportion Proportion unstable
DepVar (rows)/Controls (columns) COW Fractionalization Fractionalization 1966 Religion Language E Language F Language A Language S unstable (excluding factors w/ > 0.2 correlation)
GDP per capita (1950) 184.70 151.70 195.83 228.82 223.81 145.99 183.26 174.13 143.54 253.99 180.09 0.181818182 0.142857143
[142.857] [153.400] [138.632] [135.649] [146.674] [145.510] [144.840] [132.262] [145.396] [137.043] [150.884]
Life Exp. At Birth (1965) 1.96 2.66 2.58 1.66 2.94 2.91 1.91 1.38 1.28 3.04 1.75 0.454545455 0.428571429
[1.420] [1.235] [1.416] [1.422] [1.093] [1.167] [1.431] [1.484] [1.484] [1.569] [1.455]
GDP per capita (Avg. 1990-2016) -413.88 672.77 1,337.37 -113.29 427.30 527.18 -353.75 211.46 -859.70 1,558.44 -255.96 0 0
[1,411.246] [1,045.312] [1,108.403] [1,345.035] [1,154.891] [1,142.106] [1,389.153] [1,381.994] [1,729.028] [980.229] [1,442.927]
Life Exp. At Birth (Avg. 1990-2016) -4.89 -3.96 -2.97 -4.21 -3.52 -3.50 -4.87 -4.26 -5.89 -2.53 -4.60 0.090909091 0
[1.906] [1.689] [1.666] [1.760] [1.636] [1.721] [1.896] [1.874] [2.135] [1.830] [1.899]
Poverty Head Count Ratio (Avg. 1990-2016) 6.77 7.20 4.21 6.06 6.48 5.66 7.06 7.79 11.83 1.37 8.03 0.090909091 0
[6.378] [6.483] [6.433] [6.555] [6.121] [6.137] [6.285] [6.870] [6.305] [6.450] [6.442]
Measles Immunity (Avg. 1990-2016) 4.64 7.13 7.45 4.70 8.18 7.16 4.67 2.25 0.80 7.29 4.31 0.181818182 0.142857143
[5.063] [4.821] [5.562] [5.369] [4.241] [4.093] [5.087] [5.353] [5.191] [6.020] [5.186]
Urban Share of Population (Avg. 1990-2016) -7.53 -5.81 -3.04 -4.60 -5.37 -5.48 -7.28 -4.86 -8.35 -4.86 -7.09 0.909090909 0.857142857
[4.223] [4.106] [4.218] [3.993] [4.204] [4.206] [4.377] [4.589] [5.178] [4.104] [4.472]
Income Inequality (Avg. 1990-2016) 5.36 4.91 5.16 4.94 5.65 5.92 5.28 4.77 5.34 4.63 5.56 0 0
[2.074] [2.012] [2.058] [1.982] [2.001] [2.111] [2.002] [1.929] [2.078] [2.180] [2.115]
Financial Account Holders (Avg. 1990-2016) 10.66 9.45 8.76 9.53 10.95 10.79 9.75 5.46 6.29 9.44 10.03 0.090909091 0
[3.796] [4.064] [4.171] [4.387] [3.832] [3.849] [4.044] [4.494] [3.756] [4.604] [4.149]
Net ODA (Avg. 1990-2016) 15.68 13.87 14.87 17.13 15.02 14.87 16.73 17.26 17.67 11.85 17.66 0 0
[5.368] [6.332] [5.798] [6.597] [6.557] [6.155] [6.361] [6.824] [7.331] [6.646] [6.585]
Adult Literacy Rate (Avg. 1990-2016) 20.08 21.88 24.09 21.41 22.90 22.50 19.97 17.46 17.39 25.96 19.34 0 0
[4.520] [3.801] [4.284] [4.681] [3.880] [4.107] [4.458] [4.007] [4.289] [4.666] [4.585]
Educ. Exp. % Govt. Exp. (Avg. 1990-2016) 1.91 2.10 2.12 1.55 2.31 2.28 1.93 1.45 1.59 2.07 1.20 0 0
[0.993] [1.013] [1.076] [0.776] [0.903] [0.958] [0.981] [0.817] [0.874] [1.010] [0.698]
Gender Parity Index (Educ.) (Avg. 1990-2016) 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.181818182 0
[0.043] [0.039] [0.050] [0.044] [0.036] [0.036] [0.042] [0.037] [0.039] [0.054] [0.044]
Access to Electricity (Avg. 1990-2016) -13.76 -10.65 -6.94 -11.17 -8.53 -9.19 -14.10 -10.98 -18.97 -5.23 -14.16 0.636363636 0.571428571
[7.593] [6.981] [6.534] [7.415] [6.645] [6.578] [7.710] [7.608] [8.379] [6.590] [7.844]
Govt. Exp. % GDP (Avg. 1990-2016) 2.24 2.81 2.59 2.07 3.36 3.18 2.25 2.97 2.08 1.90 2.20 0.363636364 0.285714286
[1.392] [1.348] [1.618] [1.435] [1.355] [1.360] [1.394] [1.512] [1.395] [1.579] [1.431]
Agriculture Share of Value Added (Avg. 1990-2016) -1.82 -2.95 -3.92 -2.26 -4.48 -4.32 -1.68 -1.73 -1.13 -1.95 -1.49 0 0
[4.503] [4.548] [5.365] [4.636] [3.801] [4.120] [4.449] [4.950] [4.542] [5.776] [4.645]
Polity 2 Index (Avg. 1990-2016) 2.28 1.83 1.39 1.95 2.12 1.85 2.29 1.78 2.56 0.80 2.59 0.636363636 0.571428571
[1.264] [1.312] [1.282] [1.191] [1.351] [1.365] [1.274] [1.243] [1.323] [1.257] [1.268]
Disappearances CIRI (Avg. 1990-2016) -0.04 -0.02 -0.00 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.08 -0.03 0 0
[0.139] [0.151] [0.152] [0.155] [0.143] [0.140] [0.143] [0.176] [0.160] [0.146] [0.148]
Rule of Law WGI (Avg. 1990-2016) -0.11 -0.09 -0.11 -0.16 -0.01 -0.01 -0.10 -0.22 -0.18 -0.17 -0.07 0 0
[0.195] [0.201] [0.224] [0.195] [0.179] [0.177] [0.198] [0.205] [0.192] [0.227] [0.202]
Govt. Effectiveness WGI (Avg. 1990-2016) -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.09 0.06 0.07 -0.04 -0.15 -0.13 -0.10 -0.03 0 0
[0.181] [0.182] [0.204] [0.182] [0.161] [0.161] [0.181] [0.183] [0.174] [0.208] [0.186]
Corruption TI (Avg. 1990-2016) 0.18 0.22 0.17 0.09 0.35 0.33 0.19 0.07 0.10 0.15 0.21 0 0
[0.279] [0.270] [0.302] [0.258] [0.267] [0.262] [0.285] [0.271] [0.273] [0.303] [0.295]
Correlation with SN partition -0.0091 0.0096 0.1939 0.111 0.133 0.2071 0.0111 0.3612 -0.3335 -0.3682 0.1059
Notes: This table reports the coefficients on the Pseudo-Western Bloc variable in regressions of development outcomes when additional variables are controlled for. For each
development outcome (reported in rows), we rerun the specification in Table 6 including an additional control (listed in columns). These control variables are the country-level
counterparts, to the extent possible, of the bilateral relational components of the payoff matrix. We also calculate the number of times that there is a change in either the sign
or the statistical significance of the variable of interest when an additional variable is controlled for and we report this as a proportion of the number of control variables tested
(Proportion unstable in column 12). Due to the low number of observations, we also report this calculation excluding those control variables that are highly correlated with the
focal partition (column 13). Robust standard errors are in brackets.
Table A.6 Cold War Alliances and Long-run Outcomes: Propensity Score Estimation
Panel A: Propensity Score Weights
Dep. Var. = GDP Life Exp. Life Exp. Poverty Measles Urban Share Net ODA Educ. Exp. Govt. Exp. Agriculture Share Disappearances Rule of Law Govt. Effectiveness Corruption
per capita At Birth At Birth Head Count Ratio Immunity of Population % Govt. Exp. % GDP of Value Added CIRI WGI WGI TI
(1950) (1965) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Pseudo-Western Bloc (Strong Nash) 170.82 1.92 -4.78 6.72 4.69 -7.27 16.72 1.91 2.27 -1.79 -0.04 -0.11 -0.05 0.18
[138.66] [1.416] [1.880] [6.316] [5.028] [4.297] [6.371] [0.991] [1.380] [4.463] [0.142] [0.196] [0.178] [0.281]
GDP per capita, 1950 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.002] [0.002] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.007] [0.001] [0.001] [0.003] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 45 45 45 41 45 45 45 43 44 44 45 45 45 45
R-squared 0.034 0.380 0.319 0.327 0.051 0.241 0.132 0.095 0.109 0.223 0.003 0.104 0.166 0.192
Panel B: Controlling for Propensity Score
Dep. Var. = GDP Life Exp. Life Exp. Poverty Measles Urban Share Net ODA Educ. Exp. Govt. Exp. Agriculture Share Disappearances Rule of Law Govt. Effectiveness Corruption
per capita At Birth At Birth Head Count Ratio Immunity of Population % Govt. Exp. % GDP of Value Added CIRI WGI WGI TI
(1950) (1965) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Pseudo-Western Bloc (Strong Nash) 127.47 2.00 -4.49 6.44 4.92 -7.28 17.45 1.90 2.28 -1.78 -0.04 -0.12 -0.07 0.14
[137.10] [1.443] [1.875] [6.353] [5.117] [4.378] [6.581] [1.029] [1.414] [4.548] [0.143] [0.198] [0.178] [0.277]
GDP per capita, 1950 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.002] [0.002] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.001] [0.001] [0.004] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Propensity score 5602.08 -13.83 -61.16 113.11 -39.31 -0.22 -109.00 3.17 -5.69 -5.69 1.45 2.37 4.33 7.19
[2345.48] [16.808] [20.753] [56.335] [62.724] [52.127] [120.626] [10.402] [18.706] [44.377] [1.650] [2.463] [1.996] [2.924]
Observations 45 45 45 41 45 45 45 43 44 44 45 45 45 45
R-squared 0.145 0.391 0.366 0.349 0.054 0.250 0.147 0.096 0.113 0.232 0.011 0.119 0.217 0.248
Panel C: Nearest Neighbor Matching on Propensity Score and initial GDP p.c.
Dep. Var. = GDP Life Exp. Life Exp. Poverty Measles Urban Share Net ODA Educ. Exp. Govt. Exp. Agriculture Share Disappearances Rule of Law Govt. Effectiveness Corruption
per capita At Birth At Birth Head Count Ratio Immunity of Population % Govt. Exp. % GDP of Value Added CIRI WGI WGI TI
(1950) (1965) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016) (Avg. 1990-2016)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Pseudo-Western Bloc (Strong Nash) 210 3.06 -4.27 7.77 5.50 -6.10 14.69 2.25 2.43 -3.24 0.08 -0.05 0.03 0.29
[170.65] [1.493] [1.998] [7.305] [4.851] [4.372] [8.417] [1.117] [1.463] [3.830] [0.158] [0.157] [0.160] [0.289]
Observations 45 45 45 41 45 45 45 43 44 44 45 45 45 45
Robust standard errors in brackets.
Table A.7 Cold War Alliances and Long-run Outcomes by Post-Cold War Decades
Panel A: 1990–1999
Dep. Var. = GDP Income Financial Adult Literacy Gender Parity Access to Polity IV
per capita Inequality Account Holders Rate Index (Educ.) Electricity Index
(Avg. 1990-1999) (Avg. 1990-1999) (Avg. 1990-1999) (Avg. 1990-1999) (Avg. 1990-1999) (Avg. 1990-1999) (Avg. 1990-1999)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Pseudo-Western Bloc (Strong Nash) 467.21 6.34 24.89 0.196 -15.31 1.96
[652.215] [3.579] [7.582] [0.044] [6.813] [1.24]
GDP per capita, 1950 2.05 -0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00
[0.401] [0.004] [0.003] [0.000] [0.006] [0.001]
Observations 42 29 23 39 31 45
R-squared 0.222 0.126 0.538 0.447 0.315 0.152
Panel B: 2000–2009
Dep. Var. = GDP Income Financial Adult Literacy Gender Parity Access to Polity IV
per capita Inequality Account Holders Rate Index (Educ.) Electricity Index
(Avg. 2000-2009) (Avg. 2000-2009) (Avg. 2000-2009) (Avg. 2000-2009) (Avg. 2000-2009) (Avg. 2000-2009) (Avg. 2000-2009)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Pseudo-Western Bloc (Strong Nash) 258.19 5.03 16.08 0.043 -18.91 2.92
[666.578] [2.313] [5.169] [0.046] [6.938] [1.40]
GDP per capita, 1950 2.47 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00
[0.435] [0.004] [0.004] [0.000] [0.005] [0.001]
Observations 43 40 40 40 44 45
R-squared 0.265 0.158 0.372 0.112 0.425 0.114
Panel C: 2010–2019
Dep. Var. = GDP Income Financial Adult Literacy Gender Parity Access to Polity IV
per capita Inequality Account Holders Rate Index (Educ.) Electricity Index
(Avg. 2010-2019) (Avg. 2010-2019) (Avg. 2010-2019) (Avg. 2010-2019) (Avg. 2010-2019) (Avg. 2010-2019) (Avg. 2010-2018)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Pseudo-Western Bloc (Strong Nash) 519.96 8.33 13.64 19.24 0.05 -14.58 2.52
[667.667] [2.007] [4.406] [4.495] [0.035] [6.810] [1.22]
GDP per capita, 1950 3.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.00
[0.585] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003] [0.000] [0.005] [0.001]
Observations 43 41 42 42 35 44 45
R-squared 0.377 0.311 0.431 0.490 0.092 0.382 0.136
Robust standard errors in brackets.
C Theory Appendix
To prove our result, we show that the sum of players’ payoffs represents a strong potential





p̂ij for every i ∈ E, and Ûi(W ) =
∑
j∈W
p̂ij for every i ∈ W.
where p̂ij = sisjpij for all i, j = 1, ..., n. Let G be the set of all partitions of N into blocks,
E and W . Since N is finite, so is G. Consider now the function P defined on G as follows:









Since G is finite, the function P has a maximum over G. We claim that any such maximum
is a strong Nash equilibrium. Let (E∗,W ∗) be a maximum, and assume, on the contrary,
that it is not a strong Nash equilibrium. Thus, there exist coalition S ⊂ E∗ and T ⊂ W ∗
(one of the two could be empty), such that:
Ûi ((W
∗\T ) ∪ S) > Ûi (E∗) for all i ∈ S
and
Ûi ((E
∗\S) ∪ T ) > Ûi (W ∗) for all i ∈ T.





























j∈T p̂ij from these




















p̂ij > 0 (7)
Moreover, notice that the aggregate payoff changes of coalitions E∗\S and W ∗\T are,








































Since the sum of the left hand sides of (3) and (4) is equal to the sum of the left hand
sides of (1) and (2), we obtain:

































































This contradicts our assumption that (E∗,W ∗) is a maximizer of P and the proof is
complete 
The following example shows that there could be a strong Nash equilibrium that does
not maximize the function P.
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Consider the case with 4 players with all si equal to one, the entries pij are given by the
following matrix: 
0 2 0 −1000
2 0 1000 0
0 1000 0 1
−1000 0 1 0

Players 1 and 4 always avoid each other while players 2 and 3 always stay together. The
only degree of freedom is either player 1 or 4 will join the coalition {2, 3}. This gives rise to
two partitions, ({1, 2, 3} , {4}) and ({1} , {2, 3, 4}). Both are strong Nash equilibria but only
the first one maximizes the sum of the utilities.
The theoretical and empirical reasons to focus on the partition(s) that maximize the
potential function P have been discussed in the the theory section Besides this motivation,
it is also worthwhile to point out an interesting consequence of these considerations from
an algorithmic/computational perspective. When k = 1, 1−stable partitions (i.e. Nash
equilibria) coincide with 1−local maximizers. From an algorithmic point of view, this
suggests the use of local search algorithms to find the local maximizers. When we move
from k = 1, to k ≥ 2, the size of the local neighborhood increases. This increases the
complexity of the search but the basic idea remains the same. These issues are discussed
further in the following appendix.
D Computational Issues
After demonstrating the existence of strong Nash equilibrium for our class of games, we
now turn to the computational aspects attached to the determination of equilibria and the
algorithms to perform this task.









yi ∈ {−1, 1} for all i = 1, ..., n.
The MaxCut problem has long been known to be NP-complete. In absence of efficient
algorithms for NP-hard maximization problems, a typical approach to solving such a problem
would be to find a ρ−approximation algorithm. The latter is a polynomial-time algorithm
that delivers a solution, whose value is at least ρ times the optimal value of the problem.
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(The constant ρ is sometimes called the performance guarantee of the algorithm). The term
“ρ−approximation algorithm” is also used for randomized polynomial-time algorithm that
yields solutions whose expected value is at least ρ times the optimum. While we obtain
an exact solution to our MaxCut problem, the seminal insight of Goemans and Williamson
(1995)’s approximation algorithm is a key feature of the algorithms that we use (discussed in
the next subsection). It is thus instructive to detail their approach. Goemans and Williamson
(1995) present a randomized approximation algorithm based on a relaxation of the above






sisjdij(1− 〈vi, vj〉) ((*))
under the constraints
vi ∈ Sn for all i = 1, ..., n,
where Sn is the n−dimensional unit sphere. Let {v∗1, v∗2, ..., v∗n} be an optimal set of vectors
solution of the problem (*). Let r be a vector uniformly distributed on Sn and S ≡
{i ∈ N : 〈r, v∗i 〉 ≥ 0}. Let W be the value of the random cut produced in this way and
E [W ] be its expectation. Goemans and Williamson (1995) demonstrate that for any set of
vectors {v1, v2, . . . , vn} such that vi ∈ Sn for all i = 1, ..., n :













This algorithm has a performance guarantee of λ. To show that this algorithm can be
implemented in polynomial time, using the Cholesky decomposition, they show that problem







36Indeed, we can interpret the constraint yi ∈ {−1, 1} as restricting yi to be a 1−dimensional
vector of unit norm. Some interesting relaxation can be defined by allowing yi to be a multidi-
mensional vector vi of unit Euclidean norm. Since the linear space spanned by the vectors vi has
dimension at most n, it can be assumed that these vectors belong to Rm (or Rm for some m ≤ n)
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under the constraint that v is an n × n symmetric positive semi-definite matrix such that
vii = 1 for all i = 1, ..., n.
D.1 Sketch of algorithms
D.1.1 Exact solution of optimum (branch and bound algorithm)
(Rodrigues de Sousa et al., 2019; Anjos et al., 2013)
1. Input pairwise payoffs matrix and construct graph and corresponding triangle and
clique inequalities.
2. Solve convex relaxation of problem. Solution is the upper bound.
3. Impose the most likely to be violated clique and triangle inequalities to search for a
tighter upper bound.
4. Use the multiple operator heuristic (MOH; (Ma and Hao, 2017)) to find a lower bound.
The lower bound is always a feasible solution. If the lower bound is equal to the upper
bound, then stop. If not, then commence branching.
5. Use the initial upper and lower bounds to form the root of the tree.
6. Select the node with the highest upper bound and remove it from the tree. If its lower
bound exceeds the incumbent maximum value, update the incumbent solution. Delete
(cut) all nodes whose upper bounds are lower than the incumbent max value.
7. The next pair to form a new node is picked using the least-decided rule: Create two
subproblems: one that binds the pair of countries to be in one bloc and one that binds
them to be in separate blocs.
8. Obtain upper and lower bounds of subproblems as above.
9. Repeat (starting at step 6) until there are no nodes left (hopefully in a reasonable
amount of time). The end incumbent solution is the solution.
D.1.2 The search for other Nash Equilibria
(Palagi et al., 2012)
1. Input pairwise payoffs matrix and construct graph.
2. Apply GW approximation.
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3. Use local search algorithm.
4. Repeat 10,000 times.
D.1.3 Checking k-stability (written by Alexander Petrov)
1. Take set of NE from above, 1-stable.
2. For k ≥ 2, check for k-coalition most ‘conducive-to-deviation’ for each country.
3. If coalition satisfies condition, then NE is not k-stable.
4. If k-stable, then repeat for k + 1.
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